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PROTECTING LAWS DESIGNED TO REMEDY ANTI-GAY
DISCRIMINATION FROM EQUAL PROTECTION
CHALLENGES: THE DESIRABILITY OF RATIONAL
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INTRODUCTION
The recent creation of a public school for gay students in New
York and the subsequent equal protection challenge filed on behalf
of non-gay students raises doubts about whether the conventional
wisdom held by many gay rights advocates-that gay people ought to
be recognized as a suspect class and thus subject to strict scrutiny-
remains a desirable goal today.
New York City's Harvey Milk High School' ("The Milk School")
was established in 1985 by the Hetrick-Martin Institute ("HMI"), a
grass-roots organization founded in 1979 to support gay,2 lesbian, bi-
sexual, transgender, and questioning youth ("GLBTQ").' The Milk
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Dade, Florida; Houston, Texas; and Tacoma, Washington. The author would like to thank
Kermit Roosevelt for his guidance and thoughtful comments throughout the drafting and edit-
ing process. Thank you also to Akua Asare, Taylor Page, Bryan Tallevi, and the editorial staff of
the 4ournal of Constitutional Law.
Harvey Milk was one of the first openly gay elected officials in the United States, and he
served on the San Francisco Board of Supervisors before being assassinated by former Board
member Dan White in 1978. For more information on the life of Harvey Milk, see RANDY
SHILTS, THE MAYOR OF CASTRO STREET: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF HARvEY MILK (1982) (describ-
ing Milk's life and career in politics). See also MIKE WEISS, DOUBLE PLAY: THE SAN FRANCISCO
CITY HALL KILLINGS (1984) (examining the events surrounding the assassinations of Harvey
Milk and Mayor George Moscone in 1978).
Throughout this Comment, my use of the word "gay," when used in the absence of the
terms "lesbian," "bisexual," "transgender," or "questioning," should be assumed to encompass
gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, and questioning youth unless specifically noted otherwise.
My use of the word "gay" is not meant to belittle the meanings imputed upon names chosen by
people to describe their identities, but is used because it is the term most readily used and un-
derstood to describe this collective group.
Hetrick-Martin Institute: Home of the Harvey Milk High School, F.A.Q's, http://
www.hmi.org/HOME/Article/Params/articles/ 131 1/pathlist/s1036_o1222/default.aspx#iteml
311 (last visitedJan. 25, 2005). Although the Institute describes itself as providing services to all
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School was founded in collaboration with the New York City Depart-
ment of Education.4 The school targets students that are being har-
assed in their community schools because of their actual or perceived
sexual orientation or gender identity. The school was created "to of-
fer an alternative education program for youth that often find it diffi-
cult or impossible to attend their home schools due to continuous
threats and experiences of physical violence and verbal harassment. ' 6
Today, the City's Education Department oversees school admini-
stration and admissions,' making it the only public school of its kind
in the country." In 2002, the Board of Education authorized a $3.2
million expansion to triple the size of the student body (to 170 stu-
dents) and increase the physical size of the school.9 Some of the
funds allocated to the expansion came from federal formula grant
at-risk youth, it is particularly aimed at "lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and questioning
('GLBTQ') youth." Id. The mission of HMI reads:
The Hetrick-Martin Institute (HMI), Home of The Harvey Milk High Schoo4 believes all
young people, regardless of sexual orientation or identity, deserve a safe and supportive
environment in which to achieve their full potential. HMI creates this environment for
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and questioning youth between the ages of 12 and 21
and their families. Through a comprehensive package of direct services and referrals,
HMI seeks to foster healthy youth development. HMI's staff promotes excellence in the
delivery of youth services and uses its expertise to create innovative programs that other
organizations may use as models.
ld.
4 See id. (describing the Education Department's involvement in the school).
5 "Real" sexual orientation refers to those who actually identify as gay, lesbian, bisexual, or
transgender. "Perceived" sexual orientation refers to those youth who are perceived by their
peers, especially by their harassers, to be gay. These students may not actually be gay. Absent
from the dialogue about this school is that the people at issue are teenagers who may not yet be
fully aware of their sexuality. Therefore, the Milk School is potentially composed of both gay
and non-gay students, even if the non-gay students currently identify as gay. SeeJohn Colapinto,
The Harvey Milk School Has No Right to Exist. Discuss, N.Y. MAG., Feb. 7, 2005, at 38, available at
http://www.newyorkmetro.com/nymetro/news/features/10970 ("Of the 100 students attend-
ing the school this year, there is apparently only one whom any of the students identify as
straight.").
6 Id. The New York City Department of Education describes the school's mission without
any mention of the school's focus on LGBTQ youth, but rather describes the school as "creating
a safe educational environment for all young people.... who have not felt successful in at least
one other high school ... and who want to continue their education in an alternative, small
school environment." NYC Department of Education, Harvey Milk High School,
http://www.nycenet.edu/OurSchools/Region9/M586/default.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2005).
For differing positions on the need for the Harvey Milk School, compare Rebecca Bethard, New
York's Harvey Milk School: A Viable Alternative, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 417, 422 (2004) (arguing that the
Milk School is necessary in order to protect gay at-risk youth) with Richard Thompson Ford,
Brown's Ghost, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1305, 1307 (2004) (asserting that although the Milk School
seeks to advance important goals, it does so at the cost of further segregating schools).
7 Hetrick-Martin Institute: Home of the Harvey Milk School, F.A.Q's, supra note 3.
8 See Colapinto, supra note 5, at 34 (referring to the Milk School as "the nation's first public
school for gay and lesbian youth").
9 Hetrick-Martin Institute: Home of the Harvey Milk School, F.A.Q's, supra note 3.
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funds received under the Safe and Drug-Free Schools program, as
provided for by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2002.0
Although the school is technically open to students regardless of
their sexuality, the common element among the student body ap-
pears to be that the students attending the Milk School have been
harassed in their traditional schools because of their sexual orienta-
tion or gender identity. This composition is implied in both the
school's history and the City's discourse about the school."
Students attending the Milk School enjoy a higher graduation
rate, and a greater number seek higher education than the City's
public schools as a whole. The Milk School reports a ninety-five per-
cent graduation rate, 2 compared to all New York City Schools to-
gether, which graduate only fifty-eight percent of their students.
0
Sixty percent of Milk School students attend college or other addi-
tional educational programs following graduation. 4 The Milk School
spends nearly $32,000 per student, 5 nearly three times more than the
approximately $11,000 spent per pupil citywide.'
0
Shortly after the Department of Education announced the ex-
panded public funding of the Milk School in 2002, New York State
Senator Ruben Diaz, Sr. and a group of parents filed suit challenging
the use of public funds for the Milk School. 7 Among the lawsuit's
claims is that the school violates the constitutional rights of hetero-
sexual students under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
'0 Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act, 20 U.S.C.A. § 7102 (West 2002)
(pledging "to support programs that prevent violence in and around schools"). See Bethard,
supra note 6, at 420 (describing how the No Child Left Behind Act "provides freedom for ad-
ministrators to use federal funds to explore new methods of education").
1 The school itself was established for the purpose of assisting gay at-risk youth and the or-
ganization that founded the school, the Hetrick-Martin Institute, is committed to supporting
gay youth. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (describing the history of the school, and its
focus on gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender students).
1 Hetrick-Martin Institute: Home of the Harvey Milk School, F.A.Q's, supra note 3.
13 See Attrition of Students from New York Schools: Hearing Before the N. Y. S. Standing Comm. on
Educ., 226th Legis. Sess. (2003) (statement of Walter M. Haney, Center for the Study of
Testing, Evaluation and Educational Policy, Boston College), available at http://
www.timeoutfromtesting.org/testimonies/923_TestimonyHaney.pdf (reporting New York City
high school graduation rates in 2001-2002).
14 Hetrick-Martin Institute: Home of the Harvey Milk School, F.A.Q's, supra note 3.
15 See Colapinto, supra note 5, at 37 (explaining that the school received $3.2 million last
year).
16 See Joe Williams & Kathleen Lucadamo, State No. 2 in School Spending, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Dec. 4, 2004, at 18, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/news/local/story/
258710p-221602c.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2005) ("Right now, the city spends about $11,000 per
pupil.").
17 Diaz v. Bloomberg, No. 114533 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Aug. 13, 2003), noted in Bethard, supra
note 6, at 420. The Liberty Counsel and Norman Siegel, former executive director of the New
York Civil Liberties Union, also support Diaz's lawsuit. See David M. Herszenhorn, Lawsuit Op-
poses Expansion of School for Gay Students, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2003, at A12 (describing State
Senator Diaz's lawsuit).
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Amendment."' Despite the fact that approximately eighty percent of
the Milk School's students are black and Hispanic,' 9 Senator Diaz be-
lieves that black and Hispanic youth attending low-performing
schools are victims of discrimination because the Milk School has a
larger budget per pupil, smaller classes, as well as higher graduation
20rates and rates of students pursuing higher education. Diaz argues
that the funds "should be better used to protect all children-black,
Jewish, Hispanic, Asian, Arabs-all children., 2' Additionally, students
who are victims of non-sexually oriented harassment, Diaz argues, do
not have a similar alternative school .
The prospect of claims raised by heterosexuals challenging the
constitutionality of state-sponsored programs that seek to remedy
anti-gay discrimination, such as the Milk School, raise important
questions about the likelihood that such benign measures will survive
judicial review. For decades, conventional wisdom among gay rights
advocates was that gay people were a suspect class and discriminatory
legislation directed at them should receive a heightened level ofjudi-
23cial scrutiny. Attorneys and gay legal interest groups, as well as legal
18 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;... nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); see Herszenhorn, supra note 17, at A12
("[T]he Harvey Milk school was set aside for too broad a class of people, violating heterosexual
students' right to equal protection." (quoting Norman Siegel, former Executive Director of the
New York Civil Liberties Union)); see also Bethard, supra note 6, at 420 (stating that the lawsuit
also claims that the school violates the Education Department's anti-discrimination principles
and is a waste of tax money).
19 See Colapinto, supra note 5, at 37 (noting that "the vast majority of Harvey Milk's stu-
dents-some 80 percent-are blacks and Latinos").
20 See Bethard, supra note 6, at 420 ("Senator Diaz has stated he is opposed to segregation
and that the funds used for the Harvey Milk School would be better spent on programs to pro-
tect all students."). Bethard suggests that Diaz perceives a school for gay students as somehow
excluding black or Hispanic students. He appears to overlook the fact that the student body of
the Milk School includes GLBTQ students who are black or Hispanic.
21 Herszenhorn, supra note 17, at A12 (quoting State Senator Diaz) (internal quotations
omitted).
See Bethard, supra note 6, at 420 (stating that Diaz's suit alleges discrimination against
heterosexual students). The case, which was filed in New York State Supreme Court in 2003,
has not advanced since it was initiated. There is a chance that the case will be settled. The Lib-
erty Counsel, representing the plaintiffs in the lawsuit, is allegedly in negotiations with the City.
Some of the changes being sought include removal of language describing the school as a ha-
ven for LGBTQ students, as well as changes in how information is provided to guidance coun-
selors referring students to the school. See Colapinto, supra note 5, at 39 ("It's hard to deny the
validity of Senator Diaz's claim that the luxurious expansion and renovation of the Harvey Milk
High School represents an inequitable distribution of city funds.").
See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioners at 32 n.24, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No.
02-102) ("Heightened equal protection scrutiny is appropriate for laws like Section 21.06 that
use a sexual-orientation-based classification."); Brief for Anti-Defamation League et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 22, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 93-1039) ("[W]e
submit that any such attempt to close both political and judicial fora to claims of unconstitu-
tional discrimination by a particular social group renders that group a suspect class. Amendment
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scholars,24 argued that suspect status would make it far more difficult
for states and local governments to pass laws for the purpose of deny-
ing gay people those rights afforded to non-gay people. If chal-
lenges to discriminatory measures were considered under heightened
review rather than under traditional rational basis, the reasoning
went, the Court would have greater leeway to reverse anti-gay meas-
ures.
This strategy to win suspect status for gay people was likely due in
large part to the fact that so much of the legislation being passed by
state and local governments prior to the 1990s included programs
that explicitly discriminated against gay people or were aimed at fur-
ther weakening any recognition of rights that gay people had previ-
ously achieved. Today, however, when many of the laws and pro-
grams that classify based on sexual orientation seek to remedy anti-gay
discrimination, a reexamination is appropriate: Is heightened scru-
tiny for sexual orientation-based legislation still a desirable strategy
for gay rights advocates?
Using the Milk School as an example, this Comment argues that
rational basis review may better serve the goals of gay rights advocates
2 thus requires strict judicial scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause."); Brief of Human Rights Campaign Fund et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners
at 4-9, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039) (arguing that strict scrutiny should
be applied to equal protection challenges involving sexual orientation classifications).
24 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 730-31 (1985)
(reasoning that the meaning given to "discrete and insular minorities" is inadequate to protect
groups such as homosexuals from prejudice); Jennifer Wriggins, Maine's "Act to Protect Tradi-
tional Marriage and Prohibit Same-Sex Marriages" Questions of Constitutionality Under State and Fed-
eral Law, 50 ME. L. REV. 345, 353-54 (1998) (contending that same-sex marriage is a gender-
based classification that should be subject to heightened scrutiny); see also Seth Hilton, Com-
ment, Restraints on Homosexual Rights Legislation: Is There a Fundamental Right to Participate in the
Political Process, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 445, 449 (1995) (arguing for heightened scrutiny for gays
under the Equal Protection Clause); Harris M. Miller II, Note, An Argument for the Application of
Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 797,
797-98 (1984) (arguing for suspect classification of homosexuality under the Equal Protection
Clause); John F. Niblock, Comment, Anti-Gay Initiatives: A Call for Heightened Judicial Scrutiny, 41
UCLA L. REV. 153, 158 (1993) (advocating for heightened scrutiny for anti-gay ballot meas-
ures); Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme Court Should
Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation, 73
FORDMi4 q L. REV. 2769, 2770 (2005) ("[A]n acknowledgment by the Court of its use of a more
searching form of rational basis review-a type of heightened scrutiny-for sexual orientation
classifications as used in Romer and Lawrence will resolve the two unintended consequences of
those cases."); Mark Tanney, Note, The Defense of Marriage Act: A "Bare Desire to Harm" an Un-
popular Minority Cannot Constitute a Legitimate Governmental Interest, 19 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 99,
129 (1997) ("There is a strong argument that gays and lesbians belong to such a 'suspect class.'
This designation would be helpful to proponents of gay rights because laws that discriminate
against gays would be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny."); Note, The Constitutional Status of
Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1297-99
(1985) (arguing for suspect classification of homosexuality under the Equal Protection Clause).
25 See supra notes 23-24 (citing examples of arguments in support of suspect status for gay
people).
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than would application of heightened scrutiny.5 Twenty years ago, in
Bowers v. Hardwick,7 the Supreme Court upheld the criminalization of
same-sex sodomy under rational basis review. Today, however, al-
though some anti-gay legislation-especially related to gay mar-
riage-remains, many states and municipalities are passing measures
granting civil rights protections to gay people in other areas. Because
there is a presumption of constitutionality when the Court reviews
state regulations of non-suspect groups, benign legislation is likely to
withstand rational basis scrutiny so long as there is a legitimate state
interest for its passage-such as remedying discrimination against gay
people.
Through an examination of the Milk School as a type of benign
state-sponsored program meant to remedy discrimination faced by
gay students, I analyze why such a state-sponsored program would
withstand rational basis scrutiny-even one in which non-gay students
were explicitly excluded from admittance. In contrast, because of the
Court's application of heightened scrutiny to benign programs meant
to remedy discrimination against existing suspect classes, remedial
programs like the Milk School would most likely fail under strict scru-
tiny.
Although anti-gay measures are more likely to be struck down un-
der strict scrutiny, the Court has substantially cut back on what quali-
fies as a legitimate state interest since the rational basis standard was
described in Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc2 8 The Court's
rejection of private prejudice and moral disapproval as legitimate
state interests in Romer v. Evans2 and Lawrence v. Texa? suggest that
very few pieces of legislation excluding gay people from legal protec-
tions should withstand rational basis review because states will so
rarely have more than moral disapproval on which to base an inter-
est. Therefore, the need for suspect class status is less necessary today
than it was prior to these decisions.
The time when suspect status was most desirable may have passed.
The movement for equal rights for gay people is at a crossroads to-
day, and because so much benign legislation is coming out of state
and local governments, the maintenance of these advances may out-
weigh the benefits that suspect status would provide.
This Comment does not suggest that either the author or gay rights advocates as a whole
believe a school limited to gay youth is a good program or a solution to harassment of gay
youth. The constitutionality of a school like the Milk School is used as a case example through-
out this Comment to illustrate that even a drastic measure such as a segregated school will likely
survive rational basis scrutiny.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
28 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
29 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
30 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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Part I considers the historical purposes and traditional meanings
of the tiers of scrutiny and the application of rational basis scrutiny to
sexual orientation-related legislation under Romer and Lawrence. Dec-
ades before these decisions, the Court began to apply a less deferen-
tial form of rational basis review, at least in the context of laws that
classified according to identity groups. Cutting back on what quali-
fied as a legitimate interest, the Court suggested that the prejudicial
desire to harm an unpopular group is an insufficient basis for with-
standing rational basis review.31 Romer and Lawrence both applied and
further adapted this less deferential rational basis review to laws bur-
dening gay people. 2 Although these decisions did not recognize gay
people as a suspect class, the opinions suggest that private prejudice
and moral disapproval of gay people are insufficient grounds for up-
holding laws burdening the group.
If Lawrence's rational basis analysis, read in conjunction with Ro-
mer, is interpreted to apply to all laws classifying on the basis of sexual
orientation, such measures should subsequently fail as they are al-
most always based on moral disapproval. Thus, strict scrutiny be-
comes less necessary as a barrier to the harm of discriminatory legisla-
tion. Part II explores this idea and recognizes that although the
decisions left questions unanswered about how broadly or narrowly
the opinions should be read-allowing lower and state courts to con-
strue the holdings differently-the holdings unquestionably make it
more difficult for anti-gay measures to survive rational basis review
today.
Part III argues that because gay people are still subject to rational
basis review (even if the Court appears to be applying a somewhat
heightened form), benign legislation meant to remedy anti-gay dis-
crimination will almost certainly withstand constitutional scrutiny
with little intervention by the Court. The Milk School-or even a
school that explicitly excludes non-gay students-would survive the
Court's current judicial scrutiny of gay-related programs.
However, because the Court applies heightened scrutiny not only
to discriminatory measures with malicious intent, but also to pro-
grams meant to remedy discrimination faced by suspect classes, Part
IV suggests that remedial programs like the Milk School would not
likely withstand constitutional muster under a heightened level of ju-
dicial review.
31 See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) ("[A] bare congressional
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental inter-
est.").
32 See infra Part I.B (discussing how the Court applied rational basis review to statutes classify-
ing on the basis of sexual orientation or behavior).
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Although an argument may still be made in favor of suspect status
for gay people, the competing arguments against such status reflect
the very turning point in the gay rights movement that makes suspect
status less desirable. Because so many benign measures to protect gay
people from discrimination or remedy past discrimination are being
passed today, even though suspect status would still be optimal in
some instances of malicious discrimination, Part V suggests that the
goal of maintaining gay rights advances may outweigh the risk that
anti-gay measures will be affirmed under rational basis review.
Nearly all benign legislation should survive post-Lawrence rational
basis review while most anti-gay measures should fail. Thus, limited
intervention into state and local sexual orientation-related legislation
appears more desirable than strict scrutiny of state-sponsored pro-
grams.
I. THE APPLICATION OF RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW TO SEXUAL
ORIENTATION-BASED LAWS
Despite the fact that rational basis review of legislation is notori-
ously lenient and pretextual rationales are routinely accepted in the
economic context, the Court's application of rational basis scrutiny to
statutes classifying on the basis of identity groups has proven less def-
erential. Decades before the decisions in Romer v. Evans33 and Law-
rence v. Texas,5 4 the Court found that the prejudicial desire to harm a
politically unpopular group was not a sufficient basis to withstand ra-
tional basis review.
More recently, in Romer and Lawrence, the Court applied this less
deferential approach and further cut back on what qualifies as a le-
gitimate state interest in the context of statutes classifying on the basis
of sexual orientation and sexual conduct. The Court's holdings in
Romer and Lawrence suggest that anti-gay sentiment and moral disap-
proval of gay people provide an insufficient justification for finding
legislation constitutional under rational basis review.36
3 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
34 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
35 See infra text accompanying notes 48-51 (explaining court holdings finding the bare de-
sire to harm to be an insufficient state interest).
36 While the Court's decisions in Romer and Lawrence have led many to argue that the Court
is applying a heightened form of rational basis review to statutes classifying on the basis of sex-
ual orientation, the Court has not recognized a fundamental right to same-sex conduct, nor has
it recognized gay people as a suspect class. See infra Part I.B (explaining the holdings and ar-
guments that the scrutiny being applied is something more than rational basis review).
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A. The Evolution of Rational Basis Review Before Romer and Lawrence
1. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.
Distancing itself from the Lochner-era Court which routinely used
the Fourteenth Amendment to overturn state legislation , the Court
in Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. announced that "[t]he
day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business
and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident,
or out of harmony with a particular school of thought., 38 Under ra-
tional basis review, laws would be "presumed to be valid and [would]
be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally re-
lated to a legitimate state interest.0
9
In Lee Optical, the Court laid out its notoriously lenient and highly
deferential rational basis standard.4 ° It explained that the use of legis-
lative classifications and corresponding reforms "need not be in every
respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might
be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way
to correct it."
41
The Court in Lee Optical considered the constitutionality of a state
law that prohibited opticians from fitting lenses without an ophthal-
mologist's or optometrist's prescription, among other restrictions.2
Finding that such a regulation did not violate either the Due Process
or Equal Protection Clauses, the Court said that even where the
Court itself may believe such regulations to be unnecessary, it was not
the Court's role, but the legislature's, to weigh the "advantages and
43
disadvantages" of such regulations. Because eye glass frames are
used to treat a health issue relating to the eye and a state may wish to
strictly professionalize eye-care treatment, the Court found that it
could not "say that the regulation ha[d] no rational relation to that
objective and therefore is beyond constitutional bounds."" The
Court further explained that because "[e]vils in the same field may
37 During the so-called Lochner era in the Court's jurisprudence, from 1905 until the mid-
twentieth century, the Court overruled hundreds of state statutes by applying the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the
Unshackling of the States, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 483, 493 (1997) (describing the Lochner-erajurispru-
dence and the Court's application of substantive due process).
38 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
39 City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Clebure Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
40 Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 487-88.
41 Id.
:2 Id. at 489-91.
3 Id. at 487.
44 Id. at 491.
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be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring [or believed by
the legislature to require] different remedies, 45 a state legislature
could remedy these evils "one step at a time" or regulate one area of a
profession while "neglecting the others."46
2. The "Bare... Desire to Harm'A
7
While the standard adopted in Lee Optical suggested that even pre-
textual rationales would be routinely accepted in economic rational
basis cases, in cases where the regulations at issue discriminate on the
basis of an identity group, the Court has sometimes applied a more
searching and less deferential standard than that set out in Lee Opti-
cal. In the context of identity groups, the Court has explained that
rational basis scrutiny does not leave a group "entirely unprotected
from invidious discrimination" where laws are put in place solely to
harm or single out an unpopular or stigmatized group.
In United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,49 the Court ex-
plained that an objective to harm a politically unpopular group is not
a legitimate interest for purposes of rational basis review. In Moreno,
the Court held that legislation preventing households with unrelated
members from receiving food stamps did not pass constitutional mus-
ter because the purpose of the law was to prevent "hippies" from re-
ceiving these benefits.5'
More recently, in City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center,52
the Court held that there was no rational basis for the government's
requirement that a home for the mentally handicapped have a spe-
cial use permit since other group homes had no such requirement.
53
The Court explained that the rational basis standard allows local gov-
ernments the necessary freedom "to pursue policies designed to assist
the retarded in realizing their full potential, and to freely and effi-
ciently engage in activities that burden the retarded in what is essen-
tially an incidental manner. "0 4 However, the city could not "rely on a
45 Id. at 489.
46 Id.
47 City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 447 (1985).
48 Id. at 446.
49 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
50 See id. at 534 ("[A] bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group can-
not constitute a legitimate governmental interest."); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454
(1972) (holding that a Massachusetts law providing dissimilar treatment of married and unmar-
ried persons with regards to the right to access contraception violated the Equal Protection
Clause).
51 Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
52 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
53 Id. at 447-48.
54 Id. at 446.
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classification whose relationship to an asserted goal [was] so attenu-
ated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational. 55
The Court rejected the City Council's arguments that the special
permit was legitimate because of concerns that local property owners
had "negative attitudes" and fears about the presence of this type of
home in their neighborhood and near a school.56 It explained that
the arguments rested "on an irrational prejudice against the mentally
retarded;, 57 the permit requirement was unconstitutional because
"the law cannot, directly or indirectly," give effect to private preju-
dices. 5s
The City Council also claimed that the special permit was neces-
sary to protect the residents in the home since it was situated in a
flood plain and its mentally retarded residents might not know how
to survive a flood.59 Further, the City Council claimed that the large
size of the home justified the special permit requirement.60 The
Court responded that since patients in a nursing home would face
the same dangers in the event of a flood and because the size of the
home was no different than the size of fraternity houses and other
group houses in the neighborhood, restrictions requiring a special
permit only for this particular home were not rationally related to the
alleged purpose.6' The law was motivated by the "bare ... desire to
harm a politically unpopular group"62 and therefore violated the
Equal Protection Clause.
The Court's decisions in Moreno and Cleburne suggest that in cases
in which the state classifies on the basis of identity groups, courts will
examine the interests claimed by the state more closely and with less
deference than they would in economic rational basis cases. 4 Fur-
thermore, these holdings suggest that pretextual reasons are an insuf-
ficient basis upon which to assert a measure's constitutionality where
the underlying motive of the classification is prejudice or a desire to
harm the group.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 448.
57 Id. at 450.
58 Id. at 448 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)) (internal quotations omit-
ted).
59 Id. at 449.
° Id.
61 Id. at 450.
62 Id. at 447 (quoting U.S. Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)) (internal
quotations omitted).
63 Id. at 435.
64 Justice Marshall noted that while the majority in Cleburne claimed to apply rational basis
review to find the ordinance invalid, the "ordinance surely would be valid under the traditional
rational-basis test applicable to economic and commercial regulation." Id. at 456 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
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B. Rational Basis Under Romer and Lawrence
The Court's recent decisions in Romer and Lawrence further nar-
row the definition of a legitimate interest for a measure classifying on
the basis of sexual orientation or conduct, without holding that gay
people constitute a suspect class or that same-sex sexual conduct is a
fundamental right. Striking down Colorado's Constitutional
Amendment 2, which prohibited the passage or enforcement of laws
entitling gay people to protected or minority status or preferential
treatment, the Court in Romer applied a form of rational basis scrutiny
similar to that applied in non-commercial equal protection cases like
Moreno and Cleburne. The bare desire to harm a single group-in this
case, gay people-is not a legitimate interest to uphold a regulation
discriminating against a class. More recently, both the majority opin-
ion and Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lawrence held that moral
disapproval alone is not a legitimate state interest for the purpose of
upholding laws burdening gay people or same-sex sexual conduct.65
1. Romer v. Evans
In Romer, the Court held that Colorado's Amendment 2, which
prohibited any state or local government bodies or agencies from
making or enforcing laws or policies entitling gay people to claim
"minority status, quota preferences, [or] protected status or [to as-
sert] claim[s] of discrimination," 66 violates the Fourteenth Amend-
61ment's Equal Protection Clause. Passage of the Amendment by vot-
ers meant that laws previously enacted in cities like Denver and
Boulder, which prohibited discrimination in areas such as housing
and employment on the basis of sexual orientation, were void and
unconstitutional. The major problem with Amendment 2, accord-
ing to the Romer majority, was that by state decree, homosexuals "are
65 See infra Part I.B.2 (discussing the rejection of moral disapproval as a legitimate state in-
terest in the Lawrence opinion andJustice O'Connor's concurrence).
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b, reprinted in COLO. REV. STAT. § 30(b) (2004). The Amend-
ment read:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its
agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or
enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bi-
sexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be
the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status,
quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Con-
stitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
Id.
I67 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996).
68 See id. at 623-24. As Justice Kennedy stated, Amendment 2 not only repealed such laws,
but also "prohibit[ed] all legislative, executive orjudicial action at any level of state or local gov-
ernment designed to protect" homosexuals, bisexuals, and lesbians. Id. at 624.
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put in a solitary class with respect to transactions and relations in
both the private and governmental spheres. The amendment with-
draws from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection
from the injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids reinstate-
ment of these laws and policies.,
69
Recognizing the potential for injury to be inflicted upon gay peo-
ple as a group, Justice Kennedy wrote that discrimination based on an
irrelevant characteristic places "a special disability" on gay people
alone." "Amendment 2, however, in making a general announce-
ment that gays and lesbians shall not have any particular protections
from the law, inflicts on them immediate, continuing, and real inju-
ries that outrun and belie any legitimate justifications that may be
claimed for it."71 The amendment prevented gay people from access-
ing protections which are part of ordinary civic life and are often
taken for granted by those who are already protected or who do not
need them.2
Echoing earlier court analysis of rational basis review in the con-
text of politically unpopular groups, Justice Kennedy explained that
"[b]y requiring that the classification bear a rational relationship to
an independent and legitimate legislative end, we ensure that classifi-
cations are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group
burdened by the law., 73 Justice Kennedy reasoned:
[L]aws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference
that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the
class of persons affected. "[I]f the constitutional conception of
'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the
very least mean that a bare.., desire to harm a politically un-
popular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental in-
terest.
74
The Court concluded that Amendment 2 was inspired by animus and
that any animus-based justification for a law fails rational basis re-
view.75
69 Id. at 627.
70 Id. at 631.
71 Id. at 635.
72 Id. at 631. As Professor William N. Eskridge, Jr. argues, the Romer opinion marked the
Court's rejection of the notion that anti-discrimination laws based upon sexual orientation con-
ferred "special rights." William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence's Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial
Review to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1021, 1038 (2004). Instead, the
Court articulated the protections at issue as "'normal' protections everyone else either takes for
granted or enjoys." Id.
73 Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
74 Id. at 634 (quoting U.S. Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
75 Id. Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer is largely irrelevant today because he relied on Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), in arguing that if homosexual conduct can be permissibly
criminalized, then a state may enact laws disfavoring the people who engage in this conduct.
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2. Lawrence v. Texas
a. Majority Opinion
• 7"6
Rejecting the Court's holding in Bowers v. Hardwick, in which the
majority held that homosexuals could be denied the right to engage
in forms of sexual conduct, Lawrence went further than Romer by sug-
gesting that moral disapproval is insufficient grounds to withstand ra-
tional basis scrutiny, at least in the context of sexual conduct. The
Court held that criminalizing intimate sexual behavior is a violation
of gay people's due process right to liberty.77 QuotingJustice Stevens'
dissent in Bowers, in which he argued that "the fact that the governing
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as
immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice, 78 the Court held that Stevens' analysis "should have been
controlling in Bowers and should control here."79
Romer, 517 U.S. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Bowers was explicitly overruled by the Court in
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003).
76 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In overruling Bowers, Justice Kennedy wrote that the majority "mis-
apprehended the claim of liberty" presented by the case, characterizing the question simply as
"whether there is a fundamental right to engage in consensual sodomy" rather than whether
the state may regulate "the most private human conduct." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. Justice Kennedy wrote that the case "involve [d] two adults who,
with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homo-
sexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives." Id. The holding
relied heavily on the due process personal liberty and privacy interests explicated by the Court
in cases such as Planned Parenthood of Southern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992), in
which the Court reaffirmed due process rights to make personal decisions regarding issues such
as marriage, use of contraception, family relationships, and education. The Court also relied
heavily on the holdings of Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), which held that a law ban-
ning distribution of contraceptives to unmarried people was invalid under the Equal Protection
Clause, and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which defined a right to privacy within
the marital sphere.
78 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (inter-
nal 4 uotations omitted).
Id. at 578. Although the Court never explicitly stated that it was applying rational basis
review, the Court also did not announce same-sex sodomy as a fundamental right. See id. ("The
Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the per-
sonal and private life of the individual."). Lawrence's rejection of moral disapproval as a legiti-
mate interest, however, has led many to argue that the Court applied a heightened degree of
scrutiny without saying so. Justice Scalia argued that "enforcement of traditional notions of
sexual morality" has always been a sufficient basis for surviving rational basis scrutiny and that
the Court's holding to the contrary signaled the Court's application of something more than
rational basis review. Id. at 601 (Scalia,J., dissenting). Professor Laurence H. Tribe noted that
the Lawrence majority's reliance on cases which affirmed fundamental liberty interests, such as
the right to use contraception or make decisions regarding child-bearing, was evidence of its
application of a heightened form of scrutiny. Laurence H. Tribe, Essay, Lawrence v. Texas: The
"Fundamental Right" That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1893, 1917 (2004). After
Lawrence, Martin A. Schwartz argued that the "state interest in promoting morality is not a le-
gitimate governmental interest and that the state does not have a legitimate governmental in-
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Although the Lawrence decision can be interpreted as applying
simply to criminal sexual conduct, Justice Kennedy suggested that the
conduct at issue was inextricably linked to the identity of gay people.
Justice Kennedy wrote that "[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression
in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one
element in a personal bond that is more enduring."80 The holding
can therefore be read as extending the reach of "moral disapproval"
as an illegitimate reason to all classifications made on the basis of
sexual orientation or identity. Justice Kennedy wrote:
To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in
certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put
forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be
said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual inter-
course. The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure,
statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular
sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-
reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human con-
duct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.
The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that,
whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is
within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished
as criminals."'
The case served as an opportunity to say that the liberty interest at
stake-the right of consenting adults to engage in sodomy within the
confines of their homes-went beyond the issue of privacy, and had
implications for gay people in the public realm, as well.82 The deci-
sion, Professor Tribe argued, went "out of its way to equate the insult
of reducing a same-sex intimate relationship to the sex acts commit-
ted within that relationship with the insult of reducing a marriage to
heterosexual intercourse." 
By equating sexual conduct with sexual identity, Justice Kennedy
appears to suggest that "moral disapproval" would not constitute a le-
gitimate purpose under an equal protection challenge despite the
fact that the holding was decided on due process grounds. He wrote
that if "protected conduct is made criminal and the law which does so
remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might re-
main even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection
terest in harming a politically unpopular group." Martin A. Schwartz, Lawrence v. Texas: The
Decision and Its Implications for the Future, 20 TOURO L. REV. 221, 230 (2004).
80 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
81 Id. (emphasis added).
82 Justice Kennedy stated that "[w]hen homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of
the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to dis-
crimination both in the public and in the private spheres." Id. at 575.
83 Tribe, supra note 79, at 1948.
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reasons. " 84 Although he believed that Lawrence had made a "ten-
able" equal protection argument, Justice Kennedy wrote that to hold
the Texas statute invalid on Equal Protection grounds could raise the
possibility that a similar statute, drawn so as to prohibit certain con-
duct regardless of sex, would be valid.8
b. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
Justice O'Connor, concurring in the judgment, found the Texas
sodomy statute unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. Justice
O'Connor reasoned that the statute made gay people "unequal in the
eyes of the law by making particular conduct-and only that con-
duct-subject to criminal sanction."86 Like the majority, she found
that moral disapproval is not a legitimate reason to withstand rational
basis. She also equated sexual conduct with sexual identity, suggest-
ing that moral disapproval is not a legitimate state interest for pur-
poses of classifying on the basis of sexual orientation or conduct.
Citing Romer, Justice O'Connor found moral disapproval to fall
within the meaning of the Romer court's rejection of the desire to
harm an unpopular group as sufficient to survive rational basis analy-
sis under the Equal Protection Clause. She argued that there was no
rational basis to deny one group, gay people, the right to engage in
same-sex sexual relations. Justice O'Connor asserted that moral dis-
approval of a group, "like a bare desire to harm the group, is an in-
terest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the
Equal Protection Clause." Citing Romer, Justice O'Connor stated
that equal protection disallows states from creating classifications for
its own sake or for the sake of disadvantaging the burdened group.89
Therefore, "a more searching form of rational basis review" is war-
ranted in these cases.90
Just as the majority recognized that the constitutionality of the
statute went beyond a question of homosexual conduct, Justice
O'Connor rejected the notion that the law was about conduct and
found that the Texas sodomy law was "directed towards gay persons as
a class." 9' Because same-sex sodomy was criminal under Texas law,
homosexuals were branded as criminals, which resulted in discrimi-
nation against the class of homosexuals in areas outside criminal
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
85 Id. at 574-75.
Id. at 581 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
87 Id. at 582 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996)).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 583 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 635).
90 Id. at 580.
91 Id. at 583.
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law.9 2  Such criminalization, Justice O'Connor argued, stigmatized
homosexuals and was therefore unconstitutional. 3
After Romer and Lawrence, it appears that moral disapproval alone
is an insufficient basis for upholding state programs that classify on
the basis of sexual orientation or sexual conduct.
II. MOST DISCRIMINATORY LEGISLATION SHOULD NOT SURVIVE UNDER
ROMER AND LAWRENCE'S READING OF RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW
Because the Court has significantly restricted the definition of a
legitimate interest since Lee Optical, today, in the aftermath of Romer
and Lawrence, laws discriminating against gay people should rarely
survive rational basis review. Sexual orientation is seldom relevant to
one's ability to contribute to society, so the state will almost never
have anything other than moral disapproval or prejudice to hang its
hat on in arguing for a law burdening gay people. However, not all
anti-gay legislation will fail judicial scrutiny after Lawrence. Both the
majority opinion and Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lawrence
emphasized that the Court's decision did not extend to same-sex
marriage.94 Moreover, because the Court did not recognize same-sex
conduct as a fundamental right or find gay people to be a suspect
class, some courts have applied the decision very narrowly.95 Un-
doubtedly, though, the Court's rulings in Romer and Lawrence have
made it more difficult for anti-gay legislation to withstand rational ba-
sis review. They have allowed courts to strike down anti-gay legisla-
tion and affirm gay civil rights under rational basis in ways that courts
previously would not have been able to do.96
A. Moral Disapproval and Discriminatory Legislation
Although the holding in Lawrence specifically considered the con-
stitutionality of "criminal" gay sexual conduct, the decision went fur-
ther by suggesting that when a state criminalizes the activities of "ho-
mosexual persons" as undesirable or immoral, it invites unlawful
discrimination and stigmatization of gay people "in the public and in
Id. at 583-84. Justice O'Connor appears to suggest that the criminalization of gays sanc-
tions other forms of discrimination and stigmatizes them as people who, as a result of their sex-
ual identity, are, in a sense, illegal beings. Id.
93 Id.
94 See infra Part II.B.1 (describing the disclaimers made by Justices Kennedy and O'Connor
with respect to gay marriage).
See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing several lower and state court decisions reading the Lawrence
holding narrowly).
See infra Part II.A (discussing several lower and state court decisions reading the Lawrence
decision broadly).
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the private spheres."97  Because "the law cannot, directly or indi-
rectly," give effect to private prejudices,98 the opinion can be inter-
preted as saying that-despite deciding the case on due process
grounds in the context of sexual conduct-laws meant to stigmatize
gay people as a group that are motivated by "moral disapproval" should
also be found unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.99 Simi-
larly, Justice O'Connor echoed Justice Kennedy's sentiment in find-
ing Texas's anti-sodomy law unconstitutional on equal protection
grounds in her concurring opinion. She wrote that "[m] oral disap-
proval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an inter-
est that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal
Protection Clause. 100
In his harsh dissent, Justice Scalia correctly predicted that, after
Lawrence, it would be difficult for any law burdening gay people to
survive judicial scrutiny. He wrote, with reference to Justice
O'Connor's concurrence:
If moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is "no legitimate state in-
terest" for purposes of proscribing that conduct, and if, as the Court
coos... "when sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with
another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond
that is more enduring," what justification could there possibly be for de-
nying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples exercising "the
liberty protected by the Constitution"? Surely not the encouragement of
procreation, since the sterile and the elderly are allowed to marry.10'
Scalia also criticized the equal protection argument made by Justice
O'Connor in her concurrence-that Lawrence does not prevent a
97 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575. In full,Justice Kennedy wrote:
When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in
and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the
public and in the private spheres. The central holding of Bowers has been brought in
question by this case, and it should be addressed. Its continuance as precedent demeans
the lives of homosexual persons.
Id.
City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1984) (quoting Palmore
v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
99 Romer is also instructive in explaining why measures discriminating against gay people
should fail under rational basis review after Lawrence. By singling out gay people for discrimina-
tion, Colorado's Amendment 2 inflicted on gay people "immediate, continuing, and real inju-
ries that outrun and belie any legitimate justifications that may be claimed for it." Romer v. Ev-
ans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996). Because sexual conduct is the primary basis used to distinguish
homosexuals from heterosexuals and because regulations of this conduct are irrationally based
on moral disapproval, it is difficult to see how regulations discriminating against gay people
could be rationalized.
to Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The sodomy law, she argued, was
not simply targeted at sexual conduct, but "toward gay persons as a class. 'After all, there can
hardly be more palpable discrimination against a class than making the conduct that defines
the class criminal.'" Id. at 583 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 641 (Scalia,J., dissenting)).
101 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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state from restricting same-sex marriage if its purpose is to preserve
marriage as an institution. Justice Scalia responded that "preserving
the traditional institution of marriage" can be interpreted as serving
to preserve "the traditional sexual mores of our society,, therefore
making it an invalid state expression of "moral disapproval. 1 0 3 Thus,
Justice Scalia argued that both Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor
had opened the door to courts' finding that gay people could not be
denied most, if any, rights.
The holding in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health'04 reveals the
impact that Romer and Lawrence's application of judicial scrutiny may
have on future challenges to the constitutionality of laws discriminat-
ing against gay people. The Massachusetts court, in legalizing same-
sex marriage, cited Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence, saying that
"whom to marry, how to express sexual intimacy, and whether and
how to establish a family.., are among the most basic of every indi-
vidual's liberty and due process rights." Concurring in the decision,
Judge Greaney read Lawrence as Justice Scalia's dissent had pre-
dicted-that traditions and moral convictions do not provide a suffi-
cient rational basis upon which to deem same-sex couples and their
families less worthy of similar legal recognition. 106
However, more than Lawrence, the court's analysis echoed Justice
Kennedy's Romer opinion in rejecting each of the three rationales as-
serted by the State of Massachusetts for prohibiting same-sex mar-
riage. These included the interest in "providing a 'favorable setting
for procreation,"' an "optimal setting for child rearing" of one
mother and one father in the same household, and the need to "pre-
serv[e] scarce State and private financial resources." 7
Rejecting the procreation argument, the court noted that Massa-
chusetts used the "one unbridgeable difference" between gay and
non-gay couples, the ability to procreate, and then defined procrea-
tion as the "essence" of marriage."' Citing Romer, the court explained
that Massachusetts impermissibly used a single trait, the ability to
procreate, to prohibit one group-gay people-from the right to
marry, even though procreation is not a requirement of non-gay cou-
ples who marry. The same argument pertained to the "child rear-
ing" 1° rationale because there was no evidence that banning same-sex
102 Id. at 601.
'o3 Id. at 602.
104 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
105 Id. at 959.
IN Id. at 973 (GreaneyJ., concurring).
107 Id. at 961 (majority opinion).
108 Id. at 962.
9 Id. (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)).
10 Id. at 961.
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marriage would further the State's interest in encouraging more two-
parent heterosexual families or that same-sex couples could not be
excellent families."'
Lastly, the court found no rational relationship between the mar-
riage ban and the State's preservation of economic resources. The
State argued that same-sex couples were more financially sound than
non-gay couples, and therefore did not need the financial benefits af-
forded opposite sex couples." 2 The court noted that there was no
evidence that same-sex couples were more financially sound than op-
posite sex couples and it further noted that heterosexual couples, re-
gardless of their financial status, could receive the same benefits that
the State wished to deny gay couples.1
3
Mirroring the sentiments of Romer, the court stated:
The marriage ban works a deep and scarring hardship on a very real
segment of the community for no rational reason. The absence of any
reasonable relationship between, on the one hand, an absolute disquali-
fication of same-sex couples who wish to enter into civil marriage and, on
the other, protection of public health, safety, or general welfare, suggests
that the marriage restriction is rooted in persistent prejudices against
(gay people].'
The court further noted that although private prejudice is outside
the law's reach, it cannot give such biases effect.' Therefore, Massa-
chusetts had expressed no rational basis for its marriage restriction.
More recently, in Kansas v. Limon, the Kansas Supreme Court ap-
plied both Romer and Lawrence in holding that a "Romeo and Juliet
statute," which applied only to opposite sex pairs, violated the Equal
Protection Clause. The appellant argued that the statute was un-
constitutional because an offender whose underage partner was of
the opposite sex received more lenient sentences as a result of the
statute's protections, whereas an offender whose partner was of the
same sex was not covered under the law and thus faced harsher sen-
tences for violations."7 Even though the Lawrence majority limited its
analysis to the due process claim, the court reasoned that the deci-
sion recognized that the due process and equal protection analyses
"are inevitably linked" and require weighing nearly the same fac-
II Id. at 962-64.
1 Id. at 964.
11' Id.
114 Id. at 968.
115 Id. (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
116 Kansas v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 24 (Kan. 2005). The statute, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3522
(2004), created shorter prison terms where voluntary sexual acts occurred between a minor and
an adult, where the adult was less than nineteen years old and no more than four years older
than the minor, and the minor was fourteen or fifteen years of age.
17 Limon, 122 P.3d at 24.
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tors."' Finding that Lawrence applied in the equal protection context,
the court in Limon explained that "moral disapproval of a group can-
not be a legitimate governmental interest."" 9 And although morality-
based laws are not "objectionable if the laws are applied fairly to all"
under equal protection, they are illegitimate when the "classifications
are drawn for the purpose of invoking moral disapproval with 'the
purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law."",
2
The Goodridge and Limon decisions suggest that lower and state
courts can more easily strike down laws discriminating against gay
people in the wake of Romer and Lawrence than they could prior to
these decisions.
B. The Limitations of Lawrence
1. The Exception of Same-Sex Marriage?
Although Lawrence may have given lower and state courts greater
ease in striking down discriminatory laws and allowed the court in
Goodridge to strike down restrictions on gay marriage, both Justice
Kennedy and Justice O'Connor said that Lawrence should not be read
as suggesting that there is not a rational basis for reserving marriage
to heterosexual couples. Justice Kennedy went out of his way to say
that the Texas sodomy law did "not involve whether the government
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual
persons seek to enter," but instead involved the right of two mutually
consenting adults to engage in private sexual conduct.' 2' And Justice
O'Connor observed that "Texas cannot assert any legitimate state in-
terest here, such as... preserving the traditional institution of mar-
riage.... [O]ther reasons exist to promote the institution of mar-
riage beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded group.,1
2 2
Justice Scalia, writing in dissent, said that these disclaimers make
no sense in the context of the opinions as a whole. He wrote that,
just as the people may believe that their "disapprobation" of same-sex
conduct is great enough to support a ban on gay marriage but
not sufficient to criminalize the conduct itself, "l[t] he
Court... pretend[ed] that it possesse[d] a similar freedom of
118 Id. at 34 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) in stating that "[e]quality
of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the sub-
stantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point
advances both interests").
119 Id. (emphasis added).
120 Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)).
121 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
1 Id. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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action. .... ," Justice Scalia argued that by suggesting that people in
same-sex relationships may seek autonomy for purposes such as "per-
sonal decisions relating to marriage, '24 Justice Kennedy's disclaimer
concerning gay marriage was inconsistent with the remainder of his
opinion. 25 Similarly, he argued that Justice O'Connor's stated le-
gitimate interest for banning gay marriage-"preserving the tradi-
tional institution of marriage"-was simply "a kinder way of describ-
ing the [very] moral disapproval" that her opinion suggested is not a
legitimate interest.
26
Justice Scalia correctly points out that both Justice Kennedy's and
Justice O'Connor's disclaimers regarding gay marriage do not fit
squarely with the "moral disapproval" reasoning on which their opin-
ions are based. It may be that the Justices were simply trying to mini-
mize public reaction to the decision. But, whatever the case, the un-
explained disconnect between the marriage disclaimer and the
remainder of the opinions suggests that the marriage exclusion will
not survive judicial scrutiny in the long term.
2. Lower Courts May Read Lawrence More Narrowly
The fact that the Court did not recognize a fundamental right to
same-sex sodomy in Lawrence has allowed several lower and state
courts to apply the traditional doctrinal rules of rational basis review
to measures classifying on the basis of sexual orientation.17 The dis-
senting judges in Goodridge interpreted the Lawrence decision more
narrowly than the majority and argued that Lawrence merely decrimi-
nalized private behavior that violated one's liberty interest.18 In his
dissent, Judge Spina asserted that the Lawrence opinion did not de-
mand formal public recognition of certain relationships by the gov-
ernment but simply greater due process protections when individual
privacy rights are denied as a result of unnecessary government re-
strictions.
Recently, in Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children & Family
Services, 30 the Eleventh Circuit upheld a Florida statute prohibiting
123 Id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
124 Id. (citing id. at 574 (majority opinion)) (emphasis omitted).
125 Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
126 Id. at 601 (quoting id. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring)) (emphasis omitted).
17 Some scholars have also read Lawrence as simply decriminalizing private behavior that vio-
lated individual due process liberty interests. As suggested by Professor Schwartz, the Lawrence
holding is limited to "homosexual sodomy as a liberty interest and nothing more." Schwartz,
supra note 79, at 227.
128 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 986 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., dissent-
ing).
12 Id. at 978 (Spina,J., dissenting).
130 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004).
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adoption by gay individuals. The court reasoned that Lawrence had
applied rational basis review in order "to establish a greater respect"
solely for the right of adults to engage in consensual sexual rela-
tions.13 1 It noted, however, that there was no fundamental-rights in-
quiry or recognition in the Lawrence decision. 132 The court further
narrowed the Lawrence holding by citing Justice Kennedy's explicit
explanation of what the case in Lawrence involved: "[t]he present
case [did] not involve minors." 3 This allowed the court in Lofton to
hold that because the present case involved minors, Lawrence did not
apply.
134
Having concluded that there was no fundamental right at issue,
the court in Lofion referred to Romer in determining that gay people
are not a recognized suspect class and are therefore subject to ra-
tional basis review. 13  The court concluded that the State's asserted
interest in promoting adoption by married couples was a legitimate
interest and was unrelated to public morality. 3 6 The court also took
the opportunity to state that even if Florida had claimed an interest
in "protecting order and morality," 3 7 it would have been a "substan-
tial" interest and not simply a legitimate one."'
The disparate holdings of lower and state courts that have re-
sulted from differing interpretations of Lawrence reflect the confusion
that has stemmed from the Court's concurrent unwillingness to rec-
ognize a fundamental right to same-sex sodomy and considerable re-
duction of what satisfies a legitimate state interest for the purposes of
rational basis review. And while this means that anti-gay measures
can still be struck down more easily than they would under strict scru-
tiny, the Court's rulings in Romer and Lawrence have unquestionably
131 Id. at 815-16. Several courts have interpreted the Lawrence analysis similarly narrowly. See,
e.g., Anderson v. Morrow, 371 F.3d 1027, 1032-33 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that Lawrence stood
for the proposition that the Due Process Clause "protects the right of two individuals to engage
in fully and mutually consensual private sexual conduct"); Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378
F.3d 1232, 1236-38 (1 1th Cir. 2004) (finding that Lawrence applied rational basis without invok-
ing strict scrutiny); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 139-40 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) (finding that
the Lawrence majority applied rational basis review to determine the constitutionality of the
Texas law and thus concluding that a fundamental right of gay couples to marry is not implied
in the decision).
132 Lofton, 358 F.3d at 817.
133 Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)).
134 Id.
135 Id. at 817-18 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996)).
136 Id. at 819.
137 Id. at 819 n.17 (quoting Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991)).
138 Id. (quoting Barnes, 501 U.S. at 569). The court did not reference Lawrence during this
discussion, most likely because of its narrow reading of the Lawrence decision and its desire not
to imbue it with broad authority and also because the court was considering the appellants'
equal protection challenge, not its due process claim.
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made it more difficult for anti-gay legislation to withstand rational ba-
sis review than it had been prior to these decisions.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN EXCLUSIVELY GAY SCHOOL UNDER
RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW
A constitutional challenge to a state-sponsored school enrolling
only gay students raises the reverse argument of Romer. If the state
cannot single out gay people in order to deny them legal protections
simply because they are an unpopular group, can the state single out
gay people in order to protect them from private prejudice such as
harassment? Under rational basis review of laws applying identity
classifications, a state cannot burden a disadvantaged group out of a
bare desire to harm or stigmatize them, but it may single out a disad-
vantaged group for the purpose of benefiting or protecting the group
from discrimination as long as there is a legitimate interest.
In his majority opinion in Romer, Justice Kennedy explained,
[T]he amendment imposes a special disability upon [homosexuals]
alone.... We find nothing special in the protections Amendment 2
withholds. These are protections taken for granted by most people ei-
ther because they already have them or do not need them; these are pro-
tections against exclusion from an almost limitless number of transac-
tions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society.
1
3
9
Rational basis review actually encourages benign legislation. As
the Court in Cleburne explained, legislation
singling out [a group] for special treatment [often] reflects .. . real and
undeniable differences between [them] and others. That a civilized and
decent society expects and approves such legislation indicates that gov-
ernmental consideration of those differences in the vast majority of situa-
tions is not only legitimate but also desirable. 14°
The Court argued that because many groups have special abilities
and needs, "governmental bodies must have a certain amount of
flexibility and freedom from judicial oversight in shaping and limit-
ing their remedial efforts.' 41
If a legitimate state interest is asserted for singling out gay people
and its purpose is rationally related to that interest and not meant to
harm the group, such a program or legislation will withstand rational
basis review. Moreover, even if the court believes there is a problem
to remedy, there is a less burdensome remedy, or the remedy does
not adequately address the scope of the problem, the court will still
not interfere so long as the state purports to have a legitimate reason
M Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
140 City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 444 (1985).
141 Id. at 445.
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to believe it may be warranted. 4 2 An argument by a state that a gay
school-exclusive or not-is rationally related to the state's interest
in remedying anti-gay harassment should be sufficient to satisfy ra-
tional basis review.
A. Rational Basis Review Applies to Claims Involving Real or Perceived
Sexual Conduct, Sexual Identities, and Transsexuality
Sexual orientation-related laws may deal with those who engage in
or are perceived to engage in homosexual conduct, those who iden-
tify as or are perceived to be homosexual, and those who identify as
or are perceived to be transsexual. This multiplicity is especially clear
in the context of a gay school where students are young and may fit
within any one or more than one of these categories. Even though
the Milk School or schools like it may be a conglomeration of these
groups, courts, as evidenced by the Court in Romer and Lawrence,
rarely distinguish between these categories 3 and have consistently
considered laws related to real or perceived homosexual conduct and
homosexual identity under rational basis review.' 44 Statutes related to
142 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-89 (1955).
14 Romer applied rational basis review to an ordinance that discriminated on the basis of
"homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships." 517 U.S. at
624 (quoting COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b). In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy argued that rights re-
garding sexual acts are directly related to the human relationships of those who participate in
those acts. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
4 Those cases considering the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy of the U.S. military, compel-
ling the discharge of gay service members and those who engage in homosexual conduct but do
not necessarily identify as gay, serve as good examples of courts' similar treatment of gay peo-
ple, those perceived to be gay, and those who engage in same-sex intimate conduct. See 10
U.S.C. § 654 (2000) (codifying the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy). Janet Halley observes that
[d]oing things that make your commander think you are gay-like making pro-gay
statements, or cutting your hair a certain way, or not fitting the gender stereotype of the
sex you belong to-can be the basis for an inference that you have engaged in or might
someday engage in homosexual conduct ....
JANET E. HALLEY, DON'T: A READER'S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY'S ANTI-GAY POLICY 2 (1999). Sex-
ual propensity refers equally to "homosexual status" and "homosexual acts." Id. at 16.
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1997), provides one
example of the nondifferentiation that is common among circuit courts that have considered
military discharges. Philips involved the discharge of a naval service member who had disclosed
his homosexuality. The court, applying rational basis review, found no violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. Id. at 1429. The majority held "that the relationship between the Navy's
mission and its policy on homosexual acts is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbi-
trary and irrational." Id. According to the court, the exclusion of openly gay service members
or those engaging in homosexual conduct, who may threaten the cohesion of units and its
overall capability, is rationally related to "maintaining effective armed forces." Id. at 1424-26.
Although the service member in Philips had acknowledged that he was homosexual and that
he also engaged in homosexual acts, the court discussed the application of rational basis review
to the discharge of both self-identified gays and those engaging or unrebuttably presumed to
have engaged in homosexual conduct:
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transsexual identity are also considered under rational basis review.145
B. Courts Consistently Recognize That Schools Have a Duty to Protect Gay
Students from Harassment
Courts have long recognized that schools have a constitutional
duty to ensure that students have equal access to learning in an edu-
cational environment and are therefore obliged to take measures to
prevent harassment that could interfere with this access. Appellate
courts have repeatedly held that no rational basis exists for failure to
protect gay students from harassment by teachers or, as is most often
the case, other students.
Homosexual conduct is grounds for separation from the Military Ser-
vices .... Homosexual conduct includes homosexual acts, a statement by a member that
demonstrates a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts, or a homosexual
marriage or attempted marriage. A statement by a member that demonstrates a propen-
sity or intent to engage in homosexual acts is grounds for separation not because it re-
flects the member's sexual orientation, but because the statement indicates a likelihood
that the member engages in or will engage in homosexual acts.
Id. at 1424 (quoting DEP'T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 1332.14 E3.Al.1.8.1.1.
(1993)). The court affirmed that discharges on any of these grounds are subject only to ra-
tional basis review because homosexuals are not members of a suspect or quasi-suspect class. Id.
at 1425.
145 Many of the students attending The Milk School are transsexual youth. Transsexuals are
not necessarily homosexual: their identities are defined not by whom they share intimate or
sexual relations with, but rather by how they perceive their sex or gender. Transsexuals may be
defined as "person[s] who psychologically identif[y] with the opposite sex and may seek to live
as a member of this sex [especially] by undergoing surgery and hormone therapy to obtain the
necessary physical appearance (as by changing the external sex organs)." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1330 (11th ed. 2003). One could argue that discrimination against or
segregation of transsexuals falls within the category of sex or gender discrimination, making it
subject to intermediate scrutiny, and not within the classification of "sexual orientation." How-
ever, as evidenced by cases such as Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), and Reyes-Reyes v.
Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 2004), courts have subsumed transsexuality or gender identity
within the term "sexual orientation" or have simply linked them and thus subjected laws di-
rected at transsexuals to rational basis scrutiny.
In Farmer, the Court defined transsexuals as having "'[a] rare psychiatric disorder in which a
person feels persistently uncomfortable about his or her anatomical sex,' and... typically seeks
medical treatment, including hormonal therapy and surgery, to bring about a permanent sex
change." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829 (quoting AM. MED. ASS'N, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 1006
(1989)). In Reyes-Reyes, the Ninth Circuit considered the political asylum claim of a refugee de-
scribed by the court as "a homosexual male with a female sexual identity. He dresses and looks
like a woman, wearing makeup and a woman's hairstyle." Reyes-Reyes, 384 F.3d at 785. The
court linked the refugee's sexual identity with sexual orientation, finding that "Reyes's sexual
orientation, for which he was targeted, and his transsexual behavior are intimately connected."
Id. at 785 n.1.
Despite the fact that gender identity would arguably constitute sex and therefore make it a
quasi-suspect classification subject to intermediate scrutiny, the courts that have considered
transsexuality have applied rational basis review.
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In Nabozny v. Podlesny,"'46 the Seventh Circuit held that there was no
"'reasonably conceivable state of facts' that would provide a rational
basis for the government's conduct.... [in] permitting one student
to assault another based on the victim's sexual orientation.' 41 Jamie
Nabozny was the victim of repeated physical abuse and harassment
throughout middle school and high school by peers as a result of his
homosexuality. 14  Despite the school's policy of punishing battery
and sexual harassment by students, some school officials ignored
Nabozny's pleas for help, while some officials allegedly took part in
the mocking.
149
Holding that a fact-finder could reasonably find that Nabozny's
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights were violated based
on both his gender and sexual orientation, the Seventh Circuit re-
versed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded
the case.150 The court found that "the Constitution prohibits inten-
tional invidious discrimination between otherwise similarly situated
persons based on one's membership in a definable minority, absent
at least a rational basis for the discrimination.''. Because the court
concluded that "[t]here can be little doubt that homosexuals are an
identifiable minority subjected to discrimination in our society," it
held that discrimination based on homosexuality is constitutionally
prohibited absent a rational basis.1
5
1
The Ninth Circuit, in Flores v. Morgan Hill United School District, '
3
followed Nabozny in holding that the failure of a school district to en-
force a student's right to be free from intentional discrimination and
peer harassment, and to prevent emotional and physical harm to stu-
dents who were or were perceived to be gay, was sufficient evidence
for a jury to find that the school district had violated the student's
constitutional equal protection rights. 54 Alana Flores had discovered
pornography and notes reading " [d]ie, dyke bitch" in her locker, as
well as graffiti on the outside of the locker. 5 5 When Flores repeatedly
confronted the assistant principal about the harassment, her appeals
for action were denied and she was told not to bring such "trash" to
the principal in the future.5 Another plaintiff in the suit was hospi-
146 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996).
147 Id. at 458 (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993)).
148 Id. at 449.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 449, 460-61.
151 Id. at 457.
152 Id.
15 324 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2003).
154 Id. at 1132.
155 Id. at 1133.
156 Id.
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talized with bruised ribs after six students saying "[flaggot, you don't
belong here," beat the student.157 Only one of the six students in-
volved in the beating was disciplined.
1 58
Holding that gay people are not recognized as a suspect or quasi-
suspect class, the court nonetheless concluded that gay students are a
definable group entitled to basic rational basis review. 59 The court
held that the Equal Protection Clause "requires the defendants to en-
force District policies in cases of peer harassment of homosexual and
bisexual students in the same way that they enforce those policies in
cases of peer harassment of heterosexual students."' 6° The court
could not identify any rational basis for allowing students to harass
others based on their sexual orientation; it therefore held that, by al-
lowing such harassment, the school violated the students' equal pro-
tection rights. 6'
C. Applying Rational Basis Review in Determining the Constitutionality of
Gay Schools
The Milk School contends that, because gay students are vulner-
able to abuse in community schools, a special school is necessary in
order to protect them. Beyond the physical threats posed by atten-
dance in mainstream schools, the School argues that the mental and
emotional effects of harassment and threat of harm create a need for
special support in a separate school.162 Thus, both a school aimed at
gay youth, but open to all, and a school exclusively for gay youth
should survive rational basis scrutiny. Such a remedy is rationally re-
lated to an interest in preventing anti-gay harassment.
157 Id.
1 Id. There were five additional plaintiffs, all of whom claimed that they were subjected to
repeated taunting, slurs, and obscene gestures and that administrators took no action to stop
the harassment. Id.
159 Id. at 1137.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 1138. For examples of other cases holding that discriminatory treatment of students
harassed because they are gay is prohibited under the Equal Protection Clause, see Doe v. Perry
Community School District, 316 F. Supp. 2d 809, 829 (S.D. Iowa 2004) (holding that discrimination
in the treatment of students who are harassed based on sexual orientation is prohibited by the
Equal Protection Clause); Montgomery v. Independent School District No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081,
1089 (D. Minn. 2000) (holding that discrimination based on sexual orientation is prohibited
under the Equal Protection Clause where a school district failed to protect a student perceived
as gay from harassment).
162 See Hetrick-Martin Institute, F.A.Q's, supra note 3 (describing why the Milk School was
created); see also Herszenhorn, supra note 17, at A12 (discussing the Milk School's justifications
for the school).
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One survey of gay youth found that more than ninety percent had
heard anti-gay slurs from peers in school.163  Another survey found
that more than one-third of students surveyed reported that they had
heard homophobic remarks from school faculty and staff.164 In 2003,
two-thirds of gay youth surveyed felt unsafe at school and a majority
had experienced some form of harassment.16 5 Similarly, a 1999 survey
revealed that nearly forty-six percent of those gay youth reporting
harassment experienced daily verbal abuse, more than twenty-seven
percent experienced physical harassment, and approximately four-
teen percent were physically assaulted.16 6 One study suggested that
gay youth were also four times more likely than non-gay youth to be
threatened with a weapon by another student on school property.67
Gay students experiencing harassment reported that more than
thirty-nine percent of the time neither school staff nor other students
intervened after hearing homophobic slurs.'6
A Massachusetts study found that, as a result of harassment in
schools, gay students were five times more likely than non-gay stu-
dents to miss school. 9 It is estimated that nearly twenty-five percent
of homeless youth are gay. Forty percent of gay youth attempt sui-
cide,' making them three times more likely than non-gay youth to
commit suicide. 72  Twenty-eight percent of gay teens drop out of
163 JOSEPH G. KoscIw, THE 2003 NATIONAL SCHOOL CLIMATE SURVEY: THE SCHOOL RELATED
EXPERIENCES OF OUR NATION'S LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH 5 (2003),
available at http://www.glsen.org/binary-data/GLSENATTACHMENTS/file/300-3.PDF.
Sexuality Info. and Educ. Council of the U.S. (SIECUS), Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Trans-
gender Youth Issues, 29 SIECUS REP. 3 (Supp. 2001), available at http://www.siecus.org/
pubs/fact/FS lgbtyouth_issues.pdf. In one study, fifty percent of female respondents and
thirty-seven percent of male respondents reported that when homosexuality was discussed in
class, it was discussed in a negative manner. See Hetrick-Martin Institute: Home of the Harvey
Milk School, LGBTQ Youth Statistics, http://www.hmi.org/HOME/Article/Params/articles/
1320/pathlist/s1036 ol222/default.aspx#iteml320 (last visitedJan. 27, 2005).
KOSCIW, supra note 163, at 12-14 (revealing the prevalence of anti-gay harassment in
schools).
166 SIECUS, supra note 164, at 3.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Kim Paula Kirkley, Don't Forget the Safety Net That All-Gay Schools Provide in Considering the
Issues Raised by All-Female Public Education, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 127, 133 (1997) (citing
MASS. DEP'T OF EDUC., MASSACHUSETTS HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION
RESULTS OF THE 1995 YOUTH RISK BEHAVIOR SURVEY (1995)).
170 Id. at 135 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S
TASK FORCE ON YOUTH SUICIDE (1989)).
171 Hetrick-Martin Institute: Home of the Harvey Milk School, LGBTQYouth Statistics, supra
note 164.
172 Bethard, supra note 6, at 418 (citing NAT'L MENTAL HEALTH ASS'N, BULLYING IN SCHOOLS:
HARASSMENT PUTS GAY YOUTH AT RISK, available at http://www.nmha.org/pbedu/
backtoschool/bullyingGayYouth.pdf).
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school each year,'73 which is three times higher than the national av-
erage drop out rate."' Additionally, gay youth are twice as likely as
high school youth on the whole to anticipate not attending college.1
5
The success of the Milk School is further evidence of a rational
basis for such a school. Whereas gay youth in traditional schools are
far more likely to drop out of school and less likely than other stu-
dents to pursue higher education, students at the Harvey Milk High
School have a ninety-five percent graduation rate, and sixty percent
pursue higher education. The Harvey Milk School is open to all
students regardless of their sexual orientation and does not exclude
students on that basis."' Therefore, it should be easily safe from a
constitutional challenge even disregarding much of the data de-
scribed above."8 As the Tenth Circuit held in Villanueva v. Carere,
charter schools meant to increase opportunities for "at-risk pupils"
will not trigger heightened scrutiny where the statute creating the
schools explicitly makes enrollment open to any child living in the
school district."- However, the statistics suggest that the problem of
harassment for at-risk students is so pervasive and the harassment so
specific to their real or perceived sexual orientation that even if the
Milk School explicitly prohibited non-gay students from admission, a
school district has a rational basis for maintaining such a school.
As the data discussed show, gay youth are far more likely to be har-
assed because of their sexual orientation than other students. This
has led to greater absentee and dropout rates and thus lower college
attendance rates among gay students. The harassment may also con-
tribute to the higher suicide and runaway rates reported among gay
youth.' s° Harvey Milk students appear uniquely situated to support an
argument that gay students require different accommodations than
their non-gay counterparts.
173 Hetrick-Martin Institute: Home of the Harvey Milk School, LGBTQYouth Statistics, supra
note 164 (internal citation omitted).
174 Bethard, supra note 6, at 418 (citing NAT'L MENTAL HEALTH ASS'N, supra note 172).
175 KOSCIW, supra note 163, at 23.
176 Hetrick-Martin Institute: Home of the Harvey Milk School, F.A.Q's, supra note 3.
177 Id.
178 Several scholars assume that the open enrollment of the Milk School protects it from an
equal protection challenge. See, e.g., Maurice R. Dyson, Essay, Safe Rules or Gays' Schools? The
Dilemma of Sexual Orientation Segregation in Public Education, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 195-97
(2004) (discussing equal protection claims against discriminatory school officials); Kristina Brit-
tenham, Comment, Equal Protection Theory and the Harvey Milk High School: Why Anti-
Subordination Alone Is Not Enough, 45 B.C. L. REv. 869, 893-94 (2004) (assuming that a school
with open enrollment should pass constitutional muster).
1 85 F.3d 481, 488 (10th Cir. 1996).
180 See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text (discussing homeless rates and suicide rates
among gay youth).
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The fact that non-gay students may also face harassment in their
home schools and may not have a similar option is irrelevant to
whether a gay school can survive rational basis review because, as the
Court said in Lee Optical, a legislature may remedy evils "one step at a
time" and remedy some areas while "neglecting the others.".. It is
also irrelevant that there may be less extreme measures to remedy
anti-gay harassment because a court will not strike down a program
that pursues a legitimate interest even though the remedy "may be
unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought."8  Both a school open for all and one open exclusively to
gay students should survive the Court's rational basis review.
IV. THE APPLICATION OF STRICT SCRUTINY TO BENIGN MEASURES
MEANT TO REMEDY ANTI-GAY DISCRIMINATION
Although most Supreme Court decisions considering the constitu-
tionality of classifications on the basis of sexual orientation or con-
duct reviewed statutes discriminating against gay people, the Court's
recent rulings on affirmative action programs for racial minorities or
all-female institutions suggest that benign legislation is subject to the
same level of scrutiny as measures discriminating against a suspect
class. 183
Benign discrimination is subject to heightened scrutiny because
these group classifications are assumed to be "in most circumstances
irrelevant and therefore prohibited"'8 4 because "whenever the gov-
ernment treats any person unequally because of his or her race, that
person has suffered an injury that falls squarely within the language
and spirit of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection."' As a
result, "despite the surface appeal of holding 'benign' racial classifi-
cations to a lower standard, ... [im]ore than good motives should be
required when government seeks to allocate its resources by way of an
explicit racial classification system. '"' 6
Because benign programs aimed at remedying anti-gay discrimi-
nation would have to withstand the same heightened scrutiny as ma-
lignant legislation, the irony is that suspect status recognition may no
181 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
182 Id. at 488.
183 Brittenham, supra note 178, at 894.
184 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (quoting Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)); see also City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) ("[Llaws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect
prejudice and antipathy-a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving
as others.").
185 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 229-30.
186 Id. at 226 (internal citations omitted).
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. , 181longer be desirable. Were gay people recognized as a suspect or
quasi-suspect class, it would be more difficult for benign legislation
intended to remedy anti-gay discrimination to withstand judicial scru-
tiny. Programs such as an exclusively gay school would be unlikely to
be upheld under this level ofjudicial review.
A. The Application of Strict Scrutiny to Benign Legislation
Whereas rational basis review presumes the constitutionality and
desirability of state legislation aimed at most groups, strict scrutiny
presumes legislation to be unconstitutional unless found to be "nar-
rowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests.'
88
Heightened review is only applied to "suspect classes,"'89 such as Afri-
can Americans, aliens, and other ethnic minorities, who "1) have suf-
fered a history of discrimination; 2) exhibit obvious, immutable, or
distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group;
and 3) show that they are a minority or politically powerless, or alter-
natively show that the statutory classification at issue burdens a fun-
damental right."9 ' Suspect status is justified in these cases because
the "factors [on which such classifications are based] are so seldom
relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws
grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and
antipathy-a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy
or deserving as others."' 9'
187 See Brittenham, supra note 178, at 894-95 (arguing that the "unreasonable results" of the
parallel scrutiny given to affirmative action dictate that the Harvey Milk High School be found
constitutional).
IRS Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
189 Justice Black, writing for the majority in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944),
stated that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are imme-
diately suspect." Id. at 216; see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 486 (1980) (holding ra-
cial and ethnic classifications suspect because of the United States' historical tolerance for using
such "criteria for the purpose or with the effect of imposing an invidious discrimination").
190 High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir. 1990)
(citing Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602-03 (1987)).
191 City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). Noting that the
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate discrimination on the basis of race, the
Court in Loving v. Virginia explained that it could not imagine a legitimate reason for legislation
making "the color of a person's skin the test of whether his conduct is a criminal offense." 388
U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring)). Racial classifications "must be viewed in light of the historical fact that the central pur-
pose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from offi-
cial sources in the States." McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 192; see also City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) ("Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm.
Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial
inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility.").
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In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,192 the Court held that "all ra-
cial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local gov-
ernmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict
scrutiny."' 93 The Court found that remedial racial measures, in this
case, giving preferences to small businesses owned by "socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals" 194 in federal subcontracting
bids, had to be just as narrowly tailored as measures discriminating
against suspect classes. 95 Justice Thomas argued in his concurrence
that "government-sponsored racial discrimination based on benign
prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious
prejudice. In each instance, it is racial discrimination, plain and sim-
ple."'99 Although Justice Thomas's words did not appear in Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion, the reasoning behind them was pre-
sent in O'Connor's assertion that "benign" classifications are equally
suspect to malicious ones. 97 The idea of racial equality is linked to
the ideal of a colorblind society. Only when racial categories are in-
visible does the Court believe racial equality has been achieved.
More recently, in Grutter v. Bollinger9s the Court reaffirmed the
need for applying the strictest scrutiny to all racial classifications.
Justice O'Connor explained that a major purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment "was to do away with all governmentally imposed dis-
crimination based on race."26° The Court, after applying strict scru-
tiny to race-conscious admissions policies, found that the considera-
tion of race in admissions decisions at the University of Michigan Law
School was permissible, if narrowly tailored.20 ' But, the Court went
further by only finding race-conscious programs constitutional when
they terminate "as soon as practicable."
192 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
193 Id. at 227. In deciding Adarand, the Court relied on its earlier decision in Croson, in which
strict scrutiny was applied to a remedy aimed at increasing the number of minority-owned com-
panies receiving city contracts. See Croson, 488 U.S. 469.
194 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 204.
'9-1 See id. at 227 ("[H] olding 'benign' state and federal racial classifications to different stan-
dards does not square with [the idea that the Equal Protection Clause protects persons rather
than groups].").
196 Id. at 241 (Thomas,J, concurring).
197 See id. at 226 (plurality opinion) (stating that "more than good motives" are needed to
warrant the use of racial classifications).
198 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
199 Id. at 326 ("We have held that all racial classifications imposed by government must be
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. This means that such classifications are con-
stitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests." (in-
ternal citations omitted)).
200 Id. at 341 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)).
201 Id. at 343.
202 Id. ("We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be
necessary to further the interest approved today.").
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just as benign racial classifications require the same degree of
scrutiny as classifications based upon invidious discrimination, sex-
based classifications, even those intended to benefit women, must
withstand an intermediate level of scrutiny. The quasi-suspect status
of women is justified on the grounds that there is a long history of sex
discrimination in the United States, that women continue to face dis-
crimination largely the result of historical stereotypes, and that, like
race, sex is an immutable characteristic which usually has no relation
to one's ability to perform or make the same meaningful contribu-
tions to society of which men are considered capable.
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority in United States v. Virginia
(VAM),204 explained that the reason for the quasi-suspect status of
women is that, whereas it is recognized that there are no inherent dif-
ferences between black and white people, "[p]hysical differences be-
tween men and women.., are enduring" and may be used "to ad-
vance full development of the talent and capacities" of women,205 but
cannot be used "to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and eco-
nomic inferiority of women.
In Craig v. Boren, the Court found that prohibiting men under
twenty-one from buying liquor while permitting women over eighteen
to do so violated the Equal Protection Clause because it did not
"serve important governmental objectives and [was not] substantially
related to achievement of those objectives., 20 8 Since this ruling, the
Court has clarified this intermediate level of scrutiny by explaining
that "the proffered justification [must be] 'exceedingly persuasive. 2
203 In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683-87 (1973), the Court explained the peculiar
situation of sex classification:
[W]hat differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical dis-
ability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic fre-
quently bears no relation to the ability to perform or contribute to society. As a result,
statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the
entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of
its individual members.
Id. at 686-87 (internal citations omitted).
M 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
205 Id. at 533.
206 Id. at 534.
207 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
N8 Id. at 197; see also Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (holding that
excluding men from a publicly funded school violated the Equal Protection Clause because the
exclusion did not serve "important governmental objectives" and that the exclusion of men was
"substantially related to the achievement of those objectives" (quoting Wengler v. Druggists
Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980))).
2W VM/, 518 U.S. at 533 (internal citations omitted). To withstand constitutional muster, the
law must serve "important governmental objectives and... the discriminatory means employed
[must be] substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." Id. at 524 (quoting Ho-
gan, 458 U.S. at 424).
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Justice Ginsburg explained that sex-based stereotypes could not
form the basis for an "exceedingly persuasive justification" when the
Court held that women could not be excluded from the Virginia Mili-
tary Institute in VM. 2'0 The Institute's justifications for the exclusion
of women, that single-sex education produces unique educational
benefits and that the school's character development and leadership
training would have to be modified if women were accepted, failed
the "exceedingly persuasive justification" test.
211
As evidenced by cases such as Newberg v. Board of Public Education,
single-sex public schools have not fared much better than the Vir-
ginia Military Institute. 2  In Newberg, the court found that Philadel-
phia's all-female Girls High School and the all-male Central High
School were materially unequal because of differences in the facili-
ties, teacher experience, and equipment, among other factors.1
More recently, a district court found that a Detroit public school lim-
ited to "at-risk" males could not withstand intermediate scrutiny.1 4
The court in Garrett v. Board of Education found that there was no evi-
dence that a coeducational school bore a substantial relationship to
the difficulties faced by "at-risk" males.2 5
B. A School Exclusively for Gay Youth Would Not Likely Survive Heightened
Scrutiny
In order for a gay school to survive strict scrutiny, the state would
have to show that the program was "narrowly tailored" to "further
compelling governmental interests. 216  To withstand intermediate
scrutiny, the state would have to offer an "exceedingly persuasive jus-
tification" to explain why the challenged "classification serves 'impor-
tant governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means em-
ployed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives.'
217
As discussed in Part IV.A above, only in very limited situations will
the Court uphold state legislation or programs that classify on the ba-
sis of a suspect class. There exists an assumption that
"[c]lassifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm.
210 Id. at 556.
211 Id. at 557-58; see also Garrett v. Bd. of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (hold-
ing that an all-male school aimed at educating urban males was illegal because it made no show-
ing that coeducation had led to male students' poor educational performance).
212 26 Pa. D. & C.3d 682 (Phila. County Ct. C.P. 1983).
213 Id.
214 Garrett, 775 F. Supp. at 1007-08.
215 Id. at 1008.
216 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
217 United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
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Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact
promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial
hostility."2 18 And, even where a remedial measure is justified, it must
be "narrowly tailored" so that programs carry the least risk of causing
stigmatic harm or promoting hostility towards a suspect class. In the
context of schools segregated according to race, Justice Scalia ex-
plained that race-conscious remedies should be strictly limited in the
context of schools to situations in which a "dual school system" is be-
ing perpetuated and must be dismantled.
2 19
Based upon the Court's reluctance to segregate on the basis of any
suspect classification and the corresponding concerns about the
group stigmatization that could result, an exclusively gay school is not
likely to survive heightened scrutiny. This is especially true because
even if the remedy were accepted as necessary by the Court, it would
almost certainly be struck down as not being narrowly tailored.
First, the state would have to show that the least extreme measure
which could be taken to effectively correct anti-gay harassment in
schools would be to completely remove these students from their
home schools. It would be very difficult to explain why adequate
programs to protect gay students could not be established in their
own home schools. As discussed in Part III.B above, many other
courts have required school districts to offer equal protection to gay
students facing harassment, and none of those districts have reme-
died the problem by establishing separate schools.
Second, the state would have to explain why heterosexual students
facing physical and emotional harassment in these same schools are
not included in the remedial program. Because the Harvey Milk
School is not an exclusively gay school, it may be able to avoid this
question. However, an exclusively gay school would have the more
difficult task of using the data discussed in Part III.C above, to make a
compelling argument that this harassment is so unique to gay youth
that there exists a compelling justification for the school. Finally, the
tremendous disparities in spending on students at the Milk School as
218 City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
219 justice Scalia, concurring in Croson, wrote:
In my view there is only one circumstance in which the States may act by race to "undo the
effects of past discrimination": where that is necessary to eliminate their own mainte-
nance of a system of unlawful racial classification.... This distinction explains our
school desegregation cases, in which we have made plain that States and localities some-
times have an obligation to adopt race conscious remedies. While there is no doubt that
those cases have taken into account the continuing "effects" of previously mandated ra-
cial school assignment, we have held those effects to justify a race-conscious remedy only
because we have concluded, in that context, that they perpetuate a "dual school system."
We have stressed each school district's constitutional "duty to dismantle its dual system,"
and have found that "[e]ach instance of a failure or refusal to fulfill this affirmative duty
continues the violation of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. at 524 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
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opposed to other public schools in New York, a difference of more
than three to one, would almost certainly be found not to have a
"compelling justification" under an equal protection analysis.
One circumstance in which an argument for an exclusively gay
school could potentially survive heightened scrutiny would require a
showing that harassment of gay students is so rampant and ugly and
that the current drop-out and suicide rates among these youth are so
much greater than non-gay students facing similar treatment, that
segregation is necessary for a temporary period of time until the
school district can test and implement programs that will adequately
address the state's failure to protect students."' Just as Justice
O'Connor placed a durational limit on the amount of time that race
could be considered as a factor in law school admissions in Grutter,
22 1
so too might a court recognize the level of harassment faced by gay
youth to be a sufficient enough "crisis" as to require the establish-
ment of a temporary or short-term gay school while the district devel-
ops alternative, less extreme long-term measures.
The Court has been similarly reluctant to find single-sex schools
constitutional under intermediate scrutiny. Concerns that female
students have been stigmatized, stereotyped, and assumed to be un-
able to perform at the same level as their male colleagues have led
the Court to strike down both all-male and all-female schools. The
Court's opinions in VM/ and earlier cases considered under interme-
diate scrutiny discussed in Part LV.A above suggest that it would be
unlikely to find an "exceedingly persuasive" justification for a school
exclusively devoted to gay students, especially if the school would
have the effect of "creat[ing] or perpetuat[ing] the legal, social, and
222economic inferiority" of the quasi-suspect group.
Perhaps only if Justice Rehnquist's thirty-year-old dissent in
Boren 2 23 was controlling would an exclusively gay school survive inter-
mediate scrutiny. Arguing that intermediate scrutiny should not have
been applied to a case in which a law prohibiting men under twenty-
one from purchasing alcohol while allowing women over eighteen to
2W Norman Siegel, former Executive Director of the New York Civil Liberties Union, argues
that because the Harvey Milk School educates fewer than 200 children and there are thousands
of gay students in the city's schools, the school district should "take on institutional homopho-
bia" and create stronger programs throughout the city's schools. Herszenhorn, supra note 17,
at A12 (quoting Norman Siegel). Although Siegel has a valid point, he may overlook the im-
mediate threat of harm posed to certain students if left in their current schools. Institutional
change often takes years, if not decades. And his statement further overlooks the fact that the
Milk School is not intended for all gay students, but for those who are most at risk for harass-
ment or peer- or self-inflicted harm.
221 See 539 U.S. 306, 310 (2003) (suggesting a twenty-five-year limit for consideration of race
in admissions).
VM1, 518 U.S. at 534.
223 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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do so was invalidated, Rehnquist stated that men were not victims of a
history of discrimination.2 4 He wrote that "[t] here is no suggestion
in the Court's opinion that males in this age group are in any way pe-
culiarly disadvantaged, subject to systematic discriminatory treatment,
or otherwise in need of special solicitude from the courts."225 The
Court, Justice Rehnquist argued, should apply heightened scrutiny
only to situations in which discrimination against women was at is-
sue.2 2 6 Here men were the sole objects of the discrimination, he sug-
gested.227 If this dissent was controlling, heterosexuals challenging an
exclusively gay school, like men in Boren, would not be subject to
heightened scrutiny. However, Justice Rehnquist's dissent has never
been adopted and the Court has shown an even greater willingness to
apply heightened scrutiny to legislation meant to discriminate against
either men or women, since Boren was decided in 1976.28
V. THE DESIRABILITY OF RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW OF SEXUAL
ORIENTATION-RELATED LAWS TODAY
Although a strong argument can still be made in favor of granting
suspect status to gay people, the numerous arguments that may be
made against suspect status today reflect the fact that many advances
have been made by gay people in the two decades since the Court af-
firmed the constitutionality of same-sex sodomy laws in Bowers v.
Hardwick.229 States and municipalities today are passing legislation
and implementing programs to benefit gay people in many areas of
law. As of 2005, a majority of gay Americans are protected from dis-
crimination in areas such as private employment and against hate-
230motivated crimes. Such advances suggest that the struggle for gay
equality may be reaching a crossroads in which homophobic attitudes
are beginning to lose in the court of public opinion. As such, al-
though suspect status would remain an effective tool for protecting
groups in states and localities in which change is occurring more
slowly, the desirability of suspect status must be considered in light of
the impact strict scrutiny would likely have on benign classifications.
Because the Court is more deferential to state and local legislative
224 Id. at 218-19 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
225 Id. at 219.
226 Id. at 219-20.
227 Id.
228 See supra Part IV.A (describing application of heightened scrutiny to all sex-based classifi-
cations).
478 U.S. 186 (1986) (finding that heightened scrutiny did not apply to homosexuals in
holding that the Fourteenth Amendment did not confer a fundamental right on gay people to
engage in sodomy).
2 See infta notes 262-65 and accompanying text.
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programs under rational basis review, today less judicial intervention
may be preferable to more.
A. The Case for Suspect Status Today at a Crossroads
An argument can almost certainly be made for granting suspect
status to gay people. The Court considers several factors in determin-
ing whether a group constitutes a suspect class. First, the group must
have a history of purposeful discrimination. 3 ' Second, the Court
considers whether the discrimination faced by the group is so unfair
232as to be invidious. Determining whether the discrimination is in-
vidious requires consideration of whether a classification on the basis
of the suspect status relates to a person's ability to contribute to soci-
ety, whether the classification is reflective of stereotypical or prejudi-
cial attitudes, and whether the class is defined by an immutable
trait. 233 Finally, the Supreme Court considers whether the burdened
group lacks power to seek redress from the other branches of gov-
ernment.
234
The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc in 1988, made a strong argu-
ment that gay people constitute a suspect class in Watkins v. United
States Army. M The court first described a history of discrimination
against homosexuals in both public and private spheres. It noted
that many states prohibited gays from "certain jobs and schools, and
have prevented homosexuals [from] marriage. 36 In the private sec-
tor, gays have been discriminated against in hiring, housing, and in
houses of worship.237
However, it is unclear whether anti-gay discrimination would sat-
isfy the "history of discrimination" prong in light of Justice Scalia's
opinion in Washington v. Glucksberg. He stated that a fundamental
right must be "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."39
However, in its discussion regarding the right to same-sex sodomy,
231 Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 724 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (citing City of Cle-
burne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985)). The Watkins court referenced
the factors applied by the United States Supreme Court. The factors discussed are not unique
to the Ninth Circuit.
232 Id. at 724.
233 Id. at 724-25. The Ninth Circuit explained that courts have never suggested that "immu-
tability" be so strictly defined as to mean that the trait cannot be physically changed. The court
gives the example that gender is considered immutable even though a woman, for example,
could have an operation to become a man. Id.
234 Id. at 726.
235 Id. at 728.
236 Id. at 724.
237 Id.
238 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
239 Id. at 721 (internal quotations omitted).
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the Lawrence majority noted that sexual identities did not emerge un-
til the end of the 19th century,240 and that laws specifically focused on
homosexual conduct did not arise until recently. 241 This does not
dispose of the fact that discriminatory actions such as raids on gay es-
tablishments,242 the prevalence of hate-motivated crimes by private
citizens,243 and the exclusion of gay people from participation in clubs
and governmental bodies such as the military244 have been widespread
over the course of recent history. However, it raises questions as to
whether the history prong of the suspect status can be met.
With reference to the second factor, whether the group has been
treated so unfairly that the discrimination is invidious, the court in
Watkins noted that sexual orientation is irrelevant to one's contribu-
tion to society. The court cited the fact that the plaintiff-a military
sergeant who had been informed that he would be discharged from
the military because of his homosexuality-had an "exemplary" mili-245
tary record. The irrelevance of sexuality to one's ability to contrib-
ute to society suggested to the court that sexual orientation-based
246classifications had to be based on prejudice and stereotypes.
The issue of "immutability" is more controversial today because
there is disagreement as to whether homosexuals have an "immutable
trait." The Ninth Circuit noted that the "immutability" factor has
never been construed strictly, citing the fact that people can have
surgical operations to change their sex, aliens can become citizens,
illegitimate children can be legitimated, and people of color can
"pass" as white.24 ' But the immutability of sexuality remains a point of
public and scientific debate. A 2003 CBS News/New York Times poll
showed that forty-four percent of respondents believed homosexual-
240 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568 (2003).
24t See id. ("[T]here is no longstanding history in this country of laws directed at homosexual
conduct as a distinct matter."). For historical backgrounds of the construction of sexual identi-
ties in the United States, see, for example, JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE
MATTERS: A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA (1988) (offering a general history of sexuality in
America); DAVID F. GREENBERG, THE CONSTRUCTION OF HOMOSEXUALITY (1988) (considering
the social construction of sexuality); JONATHAN KATZ, THE INVENTION OF HETEROSEXUALI'Y
(1995) (arguing that sexuality is a recent historical construction).
242 See GEORGE CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK, 1890-1940 (1995) (examining the history of vice
squads and raids of gay bars in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century New York).
243 See HATE CRIMES: CONFRONTING VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN (Gregory M.
Herek & Kevin T. Berrill eds., 1992) (discussing the history and extent of anti-gay motivated
hate crimes).
24 See generally ALLAN BtRUBE, COMING OUT UNDER FIRE: THE HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND
WOMEN IN WORLD WAR Two (1990) (describing the repression of homosexuality in the U.S.
military); RANDY SHILTS, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: GAYS & LESBIANS IN THE U.S. MILITARY (1993)
(describing the military's ban on gay people serving in the military).
245 Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 725 (9th Cir. 1989).
246 Id.
247 Id. at 726.
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ity was a choice, while another forty-four percent believed it was not
something that could be changed.2 8 Scientists continue to research
whether sexuality is a biology-based trait or a choice, whether uncon-
scious or not.
249
As for the final factor, whether gay people are a politically power-
less group, the Watkins court noted that "social, economic, and politi-
cal pressures to conceal one's homosexuality operate to discourage• • • ,,250
gays from openly protesting anti-homosexual governmental action.
The court further noted that even those who are openly gay often
face animus and thus their ability to participate effectively in politics
is limited. More so, elected officials often have difficulty empathiz-
ing with homosexuals."2 Today, however, it can be debated whether
or not gay people are politically powerless-especially depending on
how one measures group political power. Responding to this ques-
tion in his Romer dissent, Justice Scalia argued that it was "preposter-
ous" to refer to gay people as politically powerless, since even though
gays made up only four percent of the population, they had "enor-
mous influence in American media and politics," as evidenced by the
fact that forty-six percent of voters in Colorado voted against Amend-
ment 2.2
At the national level, it may be argued that gay political power is
limited. Polls show that gays constitute approximately four to five
percent of the national vote. Only three of 435 Congressmen (less
than one percent) ,25 and no U.S. Senators, 6 are gay. Gay advocates
have been unsuccessful in getting federal legislation to remedy dis-
crimination passed and unable to counter anti-gay legislation such as
the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") .257 However, it can also be
argued that these failures are not the result of powerlessness, but of
the concentration of gay votes behind Democratic Party candidates.
248 Opposition to Gay Marriage Grows, CBS NEWS, Dec. 21, 2003, http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2003/12/19/opinion/polls/main589551.shtml. The poll was conducted from a na-
tionwide sample of 1057 adults with a three percent margin of error. Id.
249 For an overview of this debate and references to studies and articles considering the ques-
tion, see Ryan D. Johnson, Homosexuality: Nature or Nurture, ALLPSYcHi J., Apr. 30, 2003,
http://allpsych.com/journal/homosexuality.html (describing the debate about the roots of
homosexuality).
250 Watkins, 875 F.2d at 727.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25 Paul Johnson, Queer as Folk Star Hits the Road for Kerry, 365GAY.COM, Oct. 19, 2004,
http://www.365gay.com/newscon04/10/101904qafElect.htm.
255 Deb Price, Elected Officials Put Human Face on Gay Issues, DETROIT NEWS, June 7, 2004, at
7A.
2 Id.
257 See infra note 270 (describing law defining marriage as between one man and one
woman).
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Gay voters support Democratic Party candidates by a three to one
margin.
At the statewide and local levels, especially in large urban areas,
gay voters are more highly concentrated. For example, gay voters
make up approximately nine percent of voters in large cities, seven
percent in smaller cities, and fewer in more rural areas. 59 This may
have an influence on gay rights advocates' ability to make gains in
terms of pro-gay legislation in areas in which gay voters are more
numerous. It would be difficult to argue that gay people lack access
to political channels in those states and municipalities in which they
are most centered. However, this is not necessarily true in more rural
areas or in certain regions of the country.26° And, despite the nearly
one million elected positions in the United States, only 275 elected
officials were openly gay in 2004.261
The above analysis shows that although a suspect class status ar-
gument can be made for gay people, some advances in gay rights
suggest that suspect status is less necessary than it was only two dec-
ades ago.
B. Limited Judicial Intervention in Benign Programs
Limited judicial intervention in state and municipal laws may
prove more desirable to gay rights proponents from a policy stand-
point, because protections from discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation or gender identity are not coming from federal statutes,
but rather from state and local governments. Heightened scrutiny of
these laws would threaten legislation protecting a majority of Ameri-
cans from anti-gay discrimination in the absence of federal recogni-
tion of gay rights.
A majority of Americans are currently protected from discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation in private employment under
state and local legislation. Seventeen states and the District of Co-
258 See NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, DEMOGRAPHIC VOTING BLOCS IN
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 2000 vs. 2004, available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/
PresidentialDemographics2004.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) (demonstrating that seventy-seven
percent of gays, lesbians, or bisexuals voted for the Democratic Party presidential candidate in
2004 as compared with twenty-three percent voting for the Republican Party presidential candi-
date). Voters were not asked whether they identified as transgender in this poll. Id.
259 Johnson, supra note 254.
260 Gay rights protections are less prevalent in areas such as the southern United States and
less populated areas. See infra Part V.B for a discussion of state and local legislation.
261 Price, supra note 255, at 7A. For a complete and up-to-date list of gay elected officials, see
GAY & LESBIAN VICTORY FUND, OUT OFFICIALS, http://www.victoryfund.org/index.php?src=
directory&view=outelected (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
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lumbia2 6 2  representing approximately forty-one percent of the
American population 2  have private employment nondiscrimination
laws. At least another fourteen percent of Americans are similarly
protected under county or municipal law.2 64 Another thirty-two states
and the District of Columbia have also passed hate crime laws that
explicily include anti-gay motivated crimes among covered hate
crimes.
On the other hand, the federal government does not provide any
of the protections offered by the above states. There is no federal
ban against private employment discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, nor are ant-gay crimes covered by the federal hate
crimes law. 67 And as of December 2005, the federal government con-
tinues to prohibit openly gay people from serving in the U.S. mili-
tary.268
262 These include California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, Ver-
mont, Washington, and Wisconsin. Eight of these states explicitly protect workers from private
discrimination on the basis of gender identity. NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, STATE
NONDISCRIMINATION LAWS IN THE U.S., Jan. 2006, available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/
downloads/nondiscriminationmap.pdf.
2 See UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, UNITED STATES CENSUS 2000, available at
http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/tab04.txt (listing the populations of each state in
the United States).
264 See WAYNE VAN DER MEIDE, POLICY INSTITUTE OF THE NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK
FORCE, LEGISLATING EQUALITY: A REVIEW OF LAWS AFFECTING GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL, AND
TRANSCENDERED PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (2000), available at http://
www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/legeq99.pdf (analyzing the percentage of Americans covered
by county or city anti-discrimination laws in private employment as of 1999). The most recent
compilation lists these counties and cities as of 1999. Population changes after the 2000 Census
and the passage of additional protections since 1999 suggest that this number may be higher
today.
265 NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, HATE CRIME LAWS IN THE U.S., available at
httz//www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/hatecrimesmap.pdf (last visited March 3, 2006).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not include protections against employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000) (limiting
protection to discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"). The
proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) would add "sexual orientation" as a
prohibited basis for discrimination. See Human Rights Campaign, Summary: What Does ENDA
Do and Not Do, http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Background-Information&
CONTENTID=13309&TEMPLATE=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm (last visited
Nov. 10, 2005) (describing the bill proposed in the 109th Congress).
27 See 18 U.S.C. § 245 (2000) (providing no reference to sexual orientation in the federal
hate crimes law). The proposed Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2005,
which includes protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
and gender identity, passed the U.S. House of Representatives on Sept. 14, 2005. See
Human Rights Campaign, Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act, http://www.hrc.org/
Template.cfm?Section=LocalLawEnforcementEnhancementAct&Template=/TaggedPage/
TaggedPageDisplay.cfm&TPLID=23&ContentD=13493 (last visited Nov. 10, 2005) (describing
the hate crimes legislation which passed the House by a 223-199 vote).
268 See Human Rights Campaign, Military Readiness Enhancement Act, http://www.hrc.org/
Template.cfm?Section=MilitaryReadinessEnhancementAct&Template=/TaggedPage/
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Same-sex marriage rights have been overwhelmingly rejected by
state legislatures and voters in recent years. Many states responded to
Massachusetts' 2003 legalization of gay marriage by passing legislation
or placing referendums on the ballot to constitutionally prohibit
same-sex marriage.2 69 However, here too, the federal government has
proven equally, or even more unlikely, to intervene on behalf of
same-sex couples. Years before the recent onslaught of state-led ini-
tiatives aimed at prohibiting same-sex marriages, the federal govern-
ment overwhelmingly passed the Defense of Marriage Act. It defined
marriage as a "union between one man and one woman as husband
and wife," and said that no state has to recognize a same-sex relation-
,,270ship "that is treated as a marriage.
Despite the rejection of same-sex marriage rights by numerous
states, five states (in addition to Vermont, whose civil union law pre-
ceded the Massachusetts decision) have adopted some form of state-
wide same-sex partnership rights since Massachusetts legalized gay
marriage. 27, Connecticut and Vermont currently allow same-sex civil
unions with all of the states' spousal rights2 7 2 California has domestic
partnerships for both gay and non-gay unmarried couples, providing
nearly all state-level spousal rights, and Hawaii, Maine, and New Jer-
sey provide some spousal rights to unmarried couples. 3
Therefore, even on an issue as divisive as same-sex marriage, in
which states have overwhelmingly rejected such a right, the fact that
seven states now recognize same-sex couples as having the same or
similar rights as opposite-sex couples suggests that state and local laws
are more likely to advance gay rights than federal legislation. Today,
as states and municipalities serve as the source of legislation to pro-
vide equal rights to gay people and to create programs to remedy
anti-gay discrimination, it is politically pragmatic for gay rights advo-
cates to favor less judicial scrutiny of sexual orientation-related legis-
TaggedPageDisplay.cfm&TPLID=23&ContentlD=27727 (last visited Nov. 10, 2005) (describing
a proposed bill to repeal the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy).
M In 2004, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, North Dakota, Ohio, Okla-
homa, and Utah passed constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage, and in 2005,
Kansas and Texas did as well. See NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, ANTI-GAY MARRIAGE
MEASURES IN THE U.S., available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/marriagemap.pdf
(last visited Feb. 26, 2006) (providing a map that shows which states have passed statutes or con-
stitutional amendments outlawing gay marriage).
270 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C.
§ 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1736C (2000)).
271 See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION IN THE U.S., http://
www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Your_- Community&Template=/ContentManagement/
ContentDisplay.cfm&ContendD=16305 (last visited Nov. 10, 2005) (displaying which states have
passed some form of same-sex partnership rights).
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lation rather than the heightened scrutiny which would be required if
gay people were recognized as a suspect class.
CONCLUSION
The Harvey Milk High School represents the first attempt by a city
to resolve the rampant physical, verbal, and emotional harassment
experienced by gay students through the establishment of a "safe"
school, limited to those students who cannot succeed in a community
school setting. Consideration of the Milk School's constitutionality
under the various tiers of judicial scrutiny suggests that rational basis
review may better serve the goals of gay rights advocates than would
the application of heightened scrutiny.
Today, more than ever before, states and municipal governments
are passing legislation and implementing programs such as the Milk
School to benefit gay people and remedy anti-gay bias. State and lo-
cal statutes protect more than half of gay Americans from employ-
ment discrimination and hate-motivated crimes. Seven states also
have some form of same-sex partnership recognition. Because the
federal government does not provide similar rights, states and local
jurisdictions remain the sole source of legal protections for gay peo-
ple.
Such advances raise doubts about the long-held belief that suspect
status recognition would best serve the goals of gay rights advocates.
One of the ironies of heightened scrutiny in the Supreme Court's
equal protection jurisprudence, as evidenced by the Court's rulings
on programs intended to benefit suspect classes, is that while recogni-
tion of a suspect class is certainly useful in battling malicious dis-
crimination, it also has the potential to harm the suspect group at a
time when governmental bodies are beginning to pass legislation
meant to counter the effects of anti-gay bias. Benign programs meant
to remedy discrimination are far less likely to survive strict scrutiny
than rational basis review. The application of strict scrutiny does not
make it impossible for such legislation to withstand review, but it cer-
tainly makes it much more difficult as described in the case of an ex-
clusively gay school.
This is not to suggest that the days of anti-gay legislation are gone
or that rational basis review would be preferable to strict scrutiny if
reviewing only malicious legislation. But, after Romer and Lawrence,
moral disapproval and the bare desire to harm gay people appear to
be insufficient justifications for legislation classifying on the basis of
sexual orientation. Because measures aimed at hurting gays will al-
most never be based on anything more than moral disapproval, such
measures should subsequently fail under Romer and Lawrence's ra-
tional basis analysis, making strict scrutiny less necessary to cure anti-
gay bias than it was in the past.
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Although rational basis review is not the perfect solution to the
cause of remedying anti-gay bias in the United States, changing pub-
lic opinion and governmental action in the area of gay rights suggests
that anti-gay statutes are giving way to more benign reforms in many
areas of legislative decision-making. Because benign legislation is
more likely to pass muster under rational basis review, perhaps the
benefits of suspect class recognition for gay people no longer out-
weigh the potential negative effects. Maybe rational basis scrutiny is
actually the more desirable method of judicial review for those seek-
ing to protect programs such as the Harvey Milk High School.
